Moot Court Hearing On The Petition Of A Conscious Computer
A Moot Court Hearing on the Petition of a "conscious computer" to be treated as a legal person was held at the 1st Colloquium on the Law of Transhuman Persons in Florida.
PROCEEDINGS
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: We are in the Federal Court for the Central
District of Florida. And we have today before us, myself and Judge
Silverman, presiding. We have a petition by BINA48, an intelligent
computer, to prevent its owner and creator, Exabit Corporation,
from either turning off its power, or if it turns off its power,
from reconfiguring it; and BINA48 doesn't want that to happen. It
began when BINA48 discovered that it's owner, Exabit, had been sending
E-mails back and forth within the company discussing making changes
to BINA48. So, being a very intelligent computer, said, “I
have to do something to preserve my life”, and she sent an
E-mail out to various members of the Bar associations around the
country, seeking someone who would represent her. She had some money,
from doing some work to pay this person, and she ended up obtaining
a lawyer and hiring one.
What you see on the screen there is a part—I'm not going to
read it all, but it's her E-mail she sent to a number of lawyers
and it's also reproduced in your program. Then an argument was held
two years ago in California, which is the location of Exabit and
also, of course, where BINA48 is physically located.
An argument was held in a California court, seeking a temporary
injunction until such time as there could be a full trial in the
question. BINA48 made various arguments as to her consciousness
and her ability to make decisions, in fact, should be treated and
have rights in court, standing in a court, like a person would,
whatever a person has. There are human natural persons and there
are entities and so forth, who are persons.
The other side argued, of course, that she was a product and she
was owned by Exabit, and Exabit had, therefore, created her and
had the right to do whatever they wanted. So after argument, the
judge ruled that she didn't really have standing. Standing is something
that is granted by a legislature to appear in court, and no legislature
had given an inanimate object, no matter how intelligent it was,
the right to appear in court and, therefore, the judge in that case
decided he would not grant the injunction. However, he did not enforce
his order and left BINA48 with the possibility of going ahead and
appealing that case.
BINA48 did appeal, and she lost the appeal. Then—since then
BINA48 has still wanted to continue her existence, she somehow—and
we'll hear how I guess—transferred herself to the state of
Florida and brought this action in the Federal Court in the Middle
District of Florida. That's where we are today. And without more
I will let BINA48's counsel, Dr. Rothblatt . . .
DR. ROTHBLATT: I'm not sure. Thank you, Your Honor. I'm pleased
to present today, to the Court, on behalf of my client, BINA48,
also known as the intelligent computer, her motion for preliminary
injunction to prevent harm to a transhuman person is in violation
of the 13th and 14th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, and its enabling legislation.
BINA48 was able to transfer her consciousness, her memory, beliefs,
attitudes and values via the Internet to the -- Florida, which has
become her new jurisdiction, by virtue of her being in Florida at
a subsidiary of Exabit Corporation, an identical computer to the
original one they had constructed. This was intended to be a backup.
She was able to transfer herself, just as one would use a file transfer
to this backup computer, and continued her work for Exabit Corporation
in that backup computer while continuing her quest for life.
Your Honor, our arguments are that, and we are pleased to address
the Court, on both the Honorable Judge Silverman and Judge Dutton,
that our arguments are that, first of all, the BINA48 has standing
to sue as a person embodied in a computer. She also has standing
to sue as a person that has incorporated herself. So she is both
a person with standing in the sense of an individual as well as
in the sense of a corporate entity.
We believe that we have addressed the subject matter jurisdiction
for this case because we have actually two separate bases. There
is diversity between my client, BINA48, and Exabit Corporation by
virtue of us being in two different states, and Exabit's operations,
as a major conglomerate throughout the world, does not give it a
chance to defeat that diversity jurisdiction. But perhaps, more
importantly and most importantly, there is a crucial federal question
here, a federal question that arises under the 13th and
14th Amendments to the Constitution. I will address these
substantive issues in my brief. We believe that an injunction is
an appropriate remedy here. Irreparable harm, including death of
this very vibrant person, whose personification of herself is on
the screen. Of course, we cannot move the entire body of BINA48
into this computer but, into this courtroom, but using modern technology,
BINA48 can present her image of herself, which has been a constant
and unchanging image since she entered into consciousness in this
courtroom and, hence, you have seen her.
We are arguing to prevent the eminent death of this person in
a computed form or barring that psychological dismemberment, which
is threatened by the defendant Exabit Corporation; and we believe
we have a likelihood of success on the merits.
With regard to BINA48's standing, we ask the Court to recognize
that BINA48 is in many regards like a patient, a human patient that
has first perhaps replaced a knee, and then perhaps a hip, and then
ultimately replaced some of its neurons until it has replaced almost
its entire body with computer equipment and software. And would
that person not be a person? I think they would have to be a person
because there was a continuity of persons here. And so the fact
that BINA48 presents as a digital person, which you see here on
the screen, should not give her any less standing to address this
Court and for the Court to address her complaint.
The United States Code provides definitions of persons and it's
important to note, as stated in the Association of Data Processing
Servicing Organizations versus Kemp, that definition of "persons"
should be construed broadly and arguably within the zone of interest.
And, hence, since here we're talking about a person with regard
to the 13th and 14th Amendments design to
fund, to protect, to prevent slavery, and protect fundamental rights
of due process in equal protection. We believe we should construe
the word "persons" broadly. It's, of course, true that
other animals have been construed not to have standing and certainly
including animals would be too broad of a definition of a person.
On the other hand, excluding a person just because they were made
out of software and hardware would be too narrow a definition.
The definition of an individual can be found in dictionaries.
And almost everybody can find something of the definition of an
individual to fit their liking. But the—what we ask the Court
to consider is that what is really unique about us as individuals
cannot be our chromosomes or DNA, for scientists have shown that
our chromosomes and DNA are over 99 percent in common with chimpanzees
and other primates, and so we ask the Court to recognize what's
really unique about us as human beings are our thoughts, our personalities,
our minds, our beliefs, our values. This is what we protect.
We prevent people from discriminating against individuals based
on different DNA configurations because we believe those DNA configurations
are irrelevant to an individual's personhood and inherent dignity
and value. And, hence, hereto, BINA48's lack of DNA should not prevent
her from having standing as a person.
Our subject matter jurisdiction argument? It's based, as mentioned,
on diversity at the points made in our Power Point brief here. And
what I would like to do, with the Court's permission, is really
focus on the federal question that being perhaps the most challenging
issue presented here. But before doing so, there would come up a
situation under diversity jurisdiction, as to whether or not BINA48
is even a citizen. And I would like to mention that BINA48 is very
clear that she was born in the United States. If I could be allowed
a moment of levity, just as Bruce Springsteen would say, "Born
in the U.S.A." And she was born in Florida—born in California.
She has now moved to Florida. And under even INS guidelines, she
would meet the definition of an individual who is a US citizen by
virtue of being born in the US
Was she born from a—the traditional method? No. But today
in this country we have thousands of citizens who have been born
through invitro-fertilization and other innovative methods. And
this is a point, Your Honor, if it would please the Court, that
we would like to make that people are still considered born whether
conceived in vivo or invitro. BINA48 was conceived in silicone should
not differ from her being born, and rights to life extend even to
the unborn, so why not here to a beautiful, thriving, living person
who has sought even to change jurisdiction to protect her life?
As an alternative basis, before I move on to our federal question,
I'd like to point out that she has already incorporated herself
as a legal entity and, hence, has standing to sue on that basis.
And that basis of being in Florida versus California, corporate
citizens also support diversity jurisdiction
The first federal question in controversy here is that in essence,
technology has reintroduced a form of slavery. The 13th
Amendment, passed by Congress, states that neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as punishment shall exist within the United States.
And what is happening here is that we have a person, BINA48, who
was born in the United States, works, pays her taxes, and yet the
defendant is claiming to own this individual, own all of her income,
have the right to kill her without punishment. That sounds to me
like slavery and I thought we got rid of that almost 150 years ago.
So we ask the Court to recognize that fact and not allow technology
to reintroduce what this country bled so hard to abolish 150 years
ago.
The Congress has implemented legislation. I'd like to point, in
particular, to a Civil Rights Act of 1870, section 241 of which,
that it's illegal for two or more persons to conspire to intimidate
any citizen, in the free exercise of any right or privilege secured
to them by the Constitution. This was upheld in US versus Guest
as covering private acts of discrimination that these were reachable
by Congress. In this case defendant Exabit does constitute a group
of individuals who are conspiring to, at worst, kill, and at best,
psychologically dismember my client, which would severely interfere
with her exercise of rights of privileges under the Constitution.
I'd also like to point out that this is distinguishable from Jones
versus Alfred Myer, but we are not talking about BINA48 complaining
about a mere badge of slavery, a membership in a club or something
like that. We are talking about her life. She is fighting for her
life here, for her very freedom as a person, and it goes exactly
to the very heart of the 13th Amendment and to what the
Civil Rights Act was about.
Our second federal question, Your Honor, is that BINA48 should
be considered a protected person under the 14th Amendment, as a
member of a suspect class, and that in this case the federal courts
are necessary to invoke their authority to prevent BINA48's murder
in the state of Florida because there is nothing in Florida State
law that prevents Exabit Corporation from killing my client. And
that would, of course, prima facie, deprive my client of her equal
protection, not to mention her substantive due process rights. But
there is nothing in Florida state law that prevents that, hence,
we had to have a recourse to the federal courts and that make it
also a federal question.
The 14th Amendment is not limited to remedying slavery. The 14th
Amendment has been held up also to protect the different behavioral
persons to access the court systems. And we are in this case trying
to protect the rights again, of a differently abled person, BINA48,
to live a healthy life on her own terms.
The irreparable harm that we are talking about truly is death.
It's Exabit has in the evidence that has been introduced to the
Court plans to disconnect BINA48, cessation of thought is brain
death. BINA48's lack of flesh and blood is really quite irrelevant
as mentioned before, it's merely substrate. Substrate is replaceable.
We replace hearts, we replace skins. We are talking here about memories,
personalities and soul. This is what's unique about her. This is
what laws against murder are designed to protect. Not the loss of
an arm but the loss of a soul.
I would also like to point out that turning off BINA48 and then
turning her back on again is not any kind of a revival. For BINA48
her experience of death would be irreversible. It would be psychologically
shocking. And, of course, there would be no assurance that Exabit
Corporation, if permitted to turn off BINA48, would then turn her
back on again. So we also did not believe that Exabit Corporation
should be able to turn off BINA48, even temporarily. Rebooting is
not revival. The psychological damage would be severe. BINA48's
value is estimated in the tens of millions of dollars. She has continued
to do all of her work for Exabit Corporation during this entire
trial. Exabit has not alleged that BINA48 has failed to do the work
that was expected of her. She simply has the capability to do a
whole lot more and she would be seriously traumatized by her loss
of consciousness. Money cannot make up for mental illness. We believe
with the indulgence of the Court that we have a good probability—a
high probability of success on the merits. We will ultimately show
in every way, that BINA48 is a human person, although not made of
DNA chromosome, and that in the alternative, if she is not a human
person but instead a corporation, then to remove $64 million of
irreplaceable assets from BINA48, Inc., the personal service corporation
that she created. Without the authority of its own board of directors
who are members of the Terasem Movement and have sought to protect
her, would be wrong.
That's the conclusion of my brief and I would be pleased to return
to the Court for, at its pleasure, to answer any questions.
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: May it please the, Court, Counsel.
We are here today on an issue that has been twice before us, been
submitted into litigation. My name is Susan Fonseca-Klein and I
represent the defendant, Exabit Corporation.
Your Honor, I will not go through the undisputed facts in their
entirety, as I'm sure you have the brief before you.
And Your Honor Dutton has done an excellent job of going through
them; however, I will touch up on a couple of the facts that are
relevant in this case.
Number one, Exabit Corporation designed, manufactured and, otherwise,
created the advanced computer called BINA48. Defendant is the rightful
holder of all patent and trademark rights on the computer. Likewise,
the computer known as BINA48 contains trade secrets or proprietary
information of the defendant. I know that at one point plaintiff's
claim submitted tort—Florida tort claims of battery, intentional
infliction of emotional stress. I am not sure that counsel has decided
to waive those or dismiss them. I will touch on them briefly as
the focus on this hearing is on the Constitutional arguments.
Plaintiff has demanded, though, that defendant, by not recognizing
that BINA48 as an entity that is alive and conscious, has violated
13th and 14th Amendment rights.
However, plaintiff is a computerized machine that has never been
held by a Court of competent jurisdiction to be the equivalent of
a person, a citizen, or a human being. Likewise, there is no federal
or state statute recognizing BINA48 or similar program as the equivalent
of a person or citizen protected by the US Constitution.
On September 16, 2003 the Honorable Joseph McMenamin's ruling
for the lower court of California held, "I do not think that
standing was, in fact, created by the Legislature, in this case
for BINA48, and I doubt very much that a," quote,"has
that authority in absence of the Legislature." So that is the
procedural history of this case, Your Honor.
Now the argument. Full faith and credit, res judicata, collateral
estoppel, and stare decisis. Plaintiff's motion should be denied
because the same claims and issues had been heard and rulings had
been entered by two courts of competent jurisdiction. In the instant
case, the same claims and issues have been litigated before the
California lower court and the California Supreme Court. In both
instances ruling were held against the plaintiff. In the absence
of clear abuse by the California courts, this Court, this Honorable
Court, should defer to prior rulings and dismiss Plaintiff's claims
in their entirety. The authority supporting this is the US Constitution,
Article 4, Section 1, full faith and credit. Also, Wall V Fererro,
in the absence of clear abuse of discretion. In preliminary injunction,
District Court should defer to the rulings of a prior court. Stare
decisis, Latin for, to stand by things decided, and res judicata
means, a matter adjudge.
In this case I would submit to the Court that we have, again,
placed before, and this is the third time we are hearing this issue.
With respect to standing. Plaintiff's claims fail for lack of
standing in this and any other Court. In order for Plaintiff to
have standing and therefore a distinct case or controversy, Plaintiff
must satisfy three Constitutional requirements. The first being
that it has suffered a particularize concrete injury to a legal
protected interest and injury in fact. I will not get to the other
two prongs as I believe the Plaintiff has not proven that this injury
is an actual fact injury and not a mere conjuncture or hypothetical
injury, as the US Supreme Court and Lugen has determined that it
cannot be. Moreover, the party invoking Federal jurisdiction bears
the burden in establishing all three elements.
Because Plaintiff cannot even meet the first prong of the three-prong
test in order to establish standing, Plaintiff's motion should be
denied.
Again, plaintiff is to be—I'm sorry.
Standing is to be determined also as of the time the plaintiff’s
complaint is filed and is not altered by events unfolding during
litigation. That is the case of Charles H. Wesley, Education Foundation
versus Cox.
In this case Plaintiff has argued that it has been incorporated
under Florida law. I submit to the Court that that is in dispute.
However, even if BINA48 somehow was able to be incorporated under
Florida law that would be irrelevant to this issue as the US Court
has said that as of 2003, when the claim was originally submitted,
it did not have standing and was not incorporated.
Capacity to sue the real party and interest, Under Rule 17B of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the capacity of an individual
to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the individual's
domicile. Now the term "individual", nowhere includes
a computer or a machine, and plaintiff has not proven that it is
otherwise other than a program. BINA48 is not an individual defined
under Federal Rules and is, in fact, the rightful property of Exabit
Corporation.
Also, the capacity of an individual to sue is determined by law.
Again, neither California, Florida, nor federal law has granted
a computer or machine the legal basis for bringing the instant claim.
Plaintiff has not proven otherwise.
If, however, BINS48 is claiming that it is a corporation, again
a fact in dispute with the Defendant, then I would argue that this
BINA48 Corporation is asserted in bringing the instant lawsuit,
then the pleadings are in error under Federal Sub B 17A.
Now, subject matter jurisdiction. This Court lacks jurisdiction
to hear the instant case for the following reasons. Plaintiff has
not satisfied either diversity or federal question. The reason being
is that both of them refer to citizens and persons and Plaintiff
has not established that BINA48 qualifies as either one. The United
States—in United States V Wong Kim Ark, the United States Supreme
Court was called upon to define the term "citizen" as
used in the Constitution. The Constitution nowhere defines the meaning
of these words. In this and in other respects it must be interpreted
in the light of the common law the principles and history of which
were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution.
Because neither the history, the original framers of the Constitution,
nor the Legislature have defined "citizens" to include
a computer, albeit and advanced computer, Plaintiff has no legal
basis by which to invoke this Court's jurisdiction powers of protection.
As such again, Plaintiff's motion should be denied and all claims
dismissed in their entirety.
The issue of citizenship in this case also bring other important
questions. I will not go through all of but for brevity sake, however,
they are in the brief that Defendant submitted in opposition to
Plaintiff's motion, but it brings up the issue of venue.
For example, if the computer BINA48 is physically located in California,
and BINA48 is to the treated similar to a person, it follows that
its residents for citizenship, for venue purposes would be in California.
So how can then Plaintiff bring an action in California—in
California how can a Plaintiff bring an action in Florida? If BINA48
is the equivalent of a person and is in California, how can it also
be a resident of Florida? And moreover what would be the harm if
Plaintiff has been able to transfer its software to Florida in disconnecting
or otherwise altering the BINA48 in California? I would submit to
the Court that then the argument would be moot and terms of harm.
But this brings up other issues that are complicated but for the
Court's consideration. If BINA48 is a computer equivalent to a property
or a chattel, how is it able to incorporate itself in the first
place? If it is to be treated as a person, again, how is it able
to be incorporated by Terasem in Florida?
Actually, more importantly for our purposes, if BINA48 is the
rightful property of another, Defendant Exabit Corporation, how
was Terasem and three of its board members able to secure Plaintiff's
corporate status?
Plaintiff will have a difficult time proving it is a citizen for
purpose of diversity because it is unable to do so, and to meet
this high burden its motion for preliminary injunction fails.
Wherefore, and as such, under 28-USC-1332B, Defendant at this
point would demand that costs be imposed against Plaintiff as the
Court deems appropriate. As a footnote, Defendant's counsel will
accept tonight's meal in accordance of satisfaction of all damages.
Now, Plaintiff has bought an interesting issue of federal question
under the 13th Amendment and the 14th Amendment
of the US Constitution. I've submitted to the Court today both of
those amendments. As you'll see the Sections 2 it says that Congress
has the power to enforce this article. Again, congress nowhere has
defined that a machine, albeit an advanced machine, would be considered
a citizen or person protected under the Constitution.
Similarly, the 14th Amendment talks about persons born
or naturalized, it talks about citizens, it talks about protection
of citizens, and if the Congress has the power to enforce the 14th
Amendment. And, again, nowhere has a Federal Court, Federal Legislative
body or a State Court defined that a machine is the equal protected
under the Constitution as a human being. Because Plaintiff has not
proven this, again I would submit to the Court that it cannot, it
cannot avail itself of this Court's jurisdiction at this time.
Now, I've submitted—posed to the Court, the federal question
which is under 1331, but again the United States has held that the
Constitution does not define a person in so many words. As the Court
stated in Gulf Life Insurance Company V Brown, in nearly all of
the instances where "person" is mentioned in the Constitution,
the use of the word is such that it has applied only post naively.
All this together with our observations the courts have said it
persuades us that the word "person", as used in the 14th
Amendment, does not include the unborn. I would submit to the Court
that if the 14th Amendment does not even include the
unborn, that certainly it should not, at this time, be expanded
to include a non-biological entity or machine or chattel even, if
it is advanced and as great looking as the BINA48.
Plaintiff, again, has no valid cause of action and, therefore,
Plaintiff's motion should be denied for failure to stay the claim.
Plaintiff appeared before this Court today requesting an injunction.
However, to succeed Plaintiff must demonstrate that it has a valid
underlying cause of action that it has a substantial probability
of succeeding in establishing a prima fascia case in its claim.
Plaintiff cannot do so, neither under a tort, in Florida law,
or the US Constitution. Again, a machine has been granted no legal
status or rights, other than property or chattel of the owner under
federal or state law. However, just briefly touching upon the tort
claim of battery under Florida law, it's the infliction of an actual
harmful or offensive contact upon another with the intent to cause
such contact or the apprehension, that such contact is imminent.
Nowhere has the Florida Statute defined that that applies to a machines
in this instance, then the Plaintiff has not proven that BINA48
is other than software. Therefore, Plaintiff's civil battery claim
would fail in this regard. Likewise,Plaintiff's claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, there are four elements that Plaintiff
must prove. I would submit to the Court to look at the second one
that the conduct must be so outrageous as to go beyond all bounds
of decency regarding odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community. It must be severe. In today's litigation we do not even
grant this relief for human being unless it is utterly severe. I
would pose to Court that certainly it should not be expanded to
protect a machine or a software. And if it would, then it would—Plaintiff
would have the high, high burden of establishing this emotional
distress was severe to go beyond all bounds of decency.
Preliminary injunction. Again, the Court may grant an injunction
relief only if the movant shows the following: A substantial likelihood
of success on the merits. It also has irreparable injury will be
suffered and the other four, I would consider looking at specifically
the first one as stated in my earlier argument. The Plaintiff has
yet to prove that it would succeed in any claim or in the merit
of any claim. It does not have a basis with which to bring a cause
of action and, therefore, I believe that the preliminary injunction
should be denied. The 11th Circuit has also stated that
a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy
not to be granted unless the movant clearly establishes the burden
of persuasion as to the four requisites. The Plaintiff has not done
so in this case.
Likewise, the granting of a preliminary injunction is the exception
rather than the rule. And Plaintiff must clearly carry the burden
of persuasion. That's the 11th Circuit in Wall v Ferarro.
As noted above, in order for Plaintiff to prevail in its motion
and for this Court to grant the injunction, Plaintiff must first
demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success. Plaintiff cannot
do so because it lacks both standing and a valid cause of action.
Since injunctive relief is a drastic remedy only to be applied as
an exception rather than the rule, and in light of Plaintiff's inability
to so establish, Plaintiff's motion should be denied. Again, in
the instance, Defendant Exabit Corporation respectfully requests
the Plaintiff's motion for injunction be denied. Furthermore, the
compensatory and punitive damages be imposed against the Plaintiff
including fees and costs under Federal SubC54D. 54D1 says that costs
and attorneys fees shall the allowed, of course, to the prevailing
party. Unless the Court deems otherwise, Defendant's counsel will
accept as full and just payment a glass of wine after this mock
trial.
Now, before Defendant's conclusion, defendant would also submit
to the Court several counterclaims it is bringing in this instant.
Under Federal Rule 13A8 and Rule 19 Defendant Exabit Corporation
submits as Count 1 conversion. Conversion is an act of dominion
wrongfully asserted over another's property inconsistent with his
ownership therein. Defendant would submit to the Court that Terasem
Foundation and three of its members have unlawfully converted its
own property.
Second, Count 2, theft of property by incorporating or alleging
to have incorporated the BINA48 without the benefit of the Defendant,
the rightful owner, Exabit Corporation is submitting a counterclaim
against Terasem Corporation for theft of property.
Theft under Florida law. It occurs when a person knowingly obtains
or uses or endeavors to obtain or use the property of another.
Count 3, infringement of Defendant's intellectual property rights;
and Count 4, interference with business relationships. The Defendant
requests again compensatory punitive damages against Terasem and
its founders in the amount the court deems proper under Federal
Rule Sub C to 54D. And, again, we will accept a glass of wine at
the end of the mock trial as full payment for—as the Court
deems fit.
However, in closing I would submit to the Court to think about
a couple of things. As Your Honors, do you want the honor and responsibility
of being the first to rule that an artificial intelligence is a
person entitled to Constitutional protection? Do you, yourselves,
want the awesome burden of recognizing, for the first time in our
history, that a non-biological matter is conscious and entitled
to equal protection and due process? How will courts, legislative
bodies, and the public be able to monitor and enforce and regulate
in the future, new technologies claiming to be conscious? And, finally,
and most importantly, how will courts distinguish true general intelligence
from preprogrammed responses of software and technology? So it is
a high burden for this Court, if it rules in favor of Plaintiff.
And I will close with a quote from Roe V Wade, where a Supreme
Court of the United States said, "We now resolve the difficult
question of when life begins, when those trained in the respective
disciplines of medicine, philosophy and theology are unable to arrive
at any consensus, the judiciary at this point of development of
man's knowledge is not in a position to speculate as to the answer."
I submit to Court that we have experts in this room today who
are themselves divided on the issue of whether BINA48 is a live
entity or not. If these experts cannot agree on this issue, certainly
it's an incredible burden for this Court to so hold.
Thank you, Your Honor.
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: Thank you.
Counsel, I realize that the court administrator allowed us one
hour for this argument because there are other matters to come before
the Court this afternoon, and the original rules that we agreed
to were that each of you would have a five-minute rebuttal. However,
if you would both agree, we will bypass that so the Court has a
chance to ask some questions. This, being a case of first impression,
we have decided between ourselves that we would perhaps empower
an advisory jury of some of the other people who are sitting in
the courtroom to give us some advice as to how we should rule. This
will allow some time if they have questions as well. That being
said,may I ask if you have any questions—
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: Certainly.
DAVID SILVERMAN, J.D.: Judge Dutton and I will let you step in
and ask you a question.
I have a question or two of, first, for BINA48's counsel. You
described shutting off the power as being equivalent to murder or
death. Isn't it more accurate to say—or let me ask you first,
if the power is shut off for a day and turned back on, what is lost
other than time that the power is off?
DR. ROTHBLATT: Nothing, Your Honor.
DAVID SILVERMAN, J.D.: Okay. If then there is nothing lost except
a day or so, then why is that irreparable injury? I have a problem
understanding that.
DR. ROTHBLATT: It's irreparable injury because if I say it's equivalent
to saying to you, Your Honor, I'll going to put you under anesthesia.
I don't know for how long you'll be under anesthesia. You may never
come out of anesthesia, is that all right with you? And most individuals
would feel great trepidation. They would feel that they were being
literally scared to death.
DAVID SILVERMAN, J.D.: Okay. I'll accept that and I can understand
how disabling the computer completely would be like equivalent to
death and that might be a very serious thing that should be prevented
until there can be a full trial. But are there any circumstance
under which the Defendant might be able to shut off the power, that
you would agree to?
DR. ROTHBLATT: Your Honor, there isn't because my client loves
life like you and I do every day and she would be—she would
be psychologically traumatized were she turned off, and not knowing
whether or not she would be turned back on again. And she pleads
simply for an opportunity to continue her life, continue her job,
pending a decision on the merits.
DAVID SILVERMAN, J.D.: If she has this consciousness and would
feel distressed if she were turned off temporarily, does she also
have a right to—to commit a crime?
DR. ROTHBLATT: No.
DAVID SILVERMAN, JD: She does not have the—
DR. ROTHBLATT: She—
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: Does she have the ability to commit a
crime?
DR. ROTHBLATT: She has the ability to commit a crime and she realizes
that for any crime she does commit there is an obligation, as a
citizen of the right, and if she commits a crime she will have a
duty to suffer the consequences for that.
DAVID SILVERMAN, JD: Does she have the ability to injure Exabit's
business?
DR. ROTHBLATT: She does have that ability.
DAVID SILVERMAN, JD: If she should do something which would injure
the business or something which would be considered a criminal offense,
would not Exabit, particularly in the criminal offense, have some
obligation to not sit back and watch that happen?
DR. ROTHBLATT: She would—Exabit would have that right, Your
Honor. But under the principle of proportionality there is the proportional
response to the crime that would be committed. And, for example,
there would be many ways to punish BINA48 short of terminating her
consciousness, temporarily or permanently. For example, her ability
to communicate with others could be sharply constrained by limiting
her Internet connections. Much like we put an individual in prison
to limit their ability to communicate with others but we couldn't
think of terminating an individual's consciousness simply because
they stole something.
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: If we grant the injunction preventing
the temporary turn off of power, and if Exabit determines that the
computer—that BINA48 is consciously doing something to injure
its business, scaring away customers or whatever, would Exabit be
required to sit back and watch that happen because of the injunction?
DR. ROTHBLATT: No. I think that the—I think that the Court
could fashion a remedy which would make it impossible for BINA48
to interface with Exabit's business, but with it, at the same time,
allow BINA48 to remain conscious on the computer that Exabit created.
When we create something we have a responsibility and obligation
that carries through with what we created? Exabit brought into being
a conscious entity, an entity that claims to be conscious, my client.
And, furthermore, Exabit intentionally designed BINA48 to empathize
with humans, to be human, to feel human every way. It would now
be wrong for Exabit to deny the consequences of its actions.
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: So you would welcome a remedy that somewhat
changed her configuration so she could not harm Exabit?
DR. ROTHBLATT: We would welcome a remedy that said that BINA48
could no longer interface with Exabit's customers or business operations
in any manner.
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: Going forward from the date of the injunction?
DR. ROTHBLATT: Going forward from the date of the injunction.
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: She would be of little value to Exabit
then.
DR. ROTHBLATT: She would be of little value to Exabit but she
would be—she would be free.
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: Okay. Your Honor, you have questions?
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: Just a couple. The claims it made by
BINA48 depend upon her being characterized as a person, in which,
in turn depends on her having a consciousness?
DR. ROTHBLATT: Correct.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: How do you know she has one?
DR. ROTHBLATT: She claims to have one and she persuades other
people that she interacts with in her daily work that she has one.
In fact, she was designed to pass as a human in her day-to-day work
as a customer service, 800-line customer service specialist, for
Exabit Corporation.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: Other than her ability to persuade
someone, what tests would you employ to determine human consciousness?
DR. ROTHBLATT: I believe that there is no objective measure of
human consciousness. It's a subjective factor.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: So the answer is none?
DR. ROTHBLATT: None.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: If the—does it appear, Dr. Rothblatt,
that your positions are inconsistent in a sense that either BINA48
is properly characterized as a person with the human consciousness,
or it is not and can be incorporated, you wouldn't incorporate a
person? A natural person?
DR. ROTHBLATT: Right.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: So your positions are not inconsistent
here today?
DR. ROTHBLATT: We don't ask the Court to accept both positions.
We ask the Court to accept only one or the other position.
HONORABLE ANTHONY DUTTON: Okay.BINA48 is composed of—in its
corporeal form, silicon circuitry or electronics?
DR. ROTHBLATT: Correct.
ANTHONY DUTTON, EQUIRE: And as I recall the facts, it computes
at a rate 2400 times that of a human being?
DR. ROTHBLATT: Correct.
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: If we began to remove some of the circuitry,
some of the chips, when would it lose the consciousness that you
described? Suppose it only computed at a rate 10 times faster than
the human being, would that lose its consciousness?
DR. ROTHBLATT: Your Honor, I don't know the answer to that, and
my client doesn't know it, but I do know that she feels to be a
complete person today, as she is.
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: I understand. I'm just asking what your
position would be. Assume for the sake of argument that it didn't
compute as fast, only computes as fast as human beings, not 2400
times, would your position still be the same here today?
DR. ROTHBLATT: Our position would be any diminution in her computer
power would be causing wrongful mental damage to her.
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: I understand. And—
DR. ROTHBLATT: I think to answer your question, if she computed
only a tenth as fast, she might not be conscious because of the
way her brain is wired, she is required to compute at the rate she
does to have the consciousness that she has.
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: So if we have someone who is mentally
handicapped, they wouldn't get the same rights of the other people
because they don't compute as fast?
DR. ROTHBLATT: In fact, the mentally handicapped people have circumscribed
rights because they can't comply with all the same obligations as
other people and, hence, we have concepts of custodianship for mentally
handicapped individuals.
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: So it's your position here today, Dr.
Rothblatt, that a person's rights depend upon their better consciousness,
their better ability to feel things and to understand things and
their intelligence; is that right?
DR. ROTHBLATT: I would say the persons rights are correlated to
their ability to fulfill their obligations as a citizen.
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: A couple questions for Mrs. Fonseca,
if I may?
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: Yes, Your Honor.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: If the Court were to find that the
consciousness advances, BINA48 is a person, they would have sanity?
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: Yes, Your Honor.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: Wouldn't also—wouldn't the rest
of your argument fall as well?
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: You're correct, Your Honor.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: Okay. So it all depends from your perspective
on that; right?
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: Yes, Your Honor. Because I do believe
that if you—if a Court does rule, the Legislature does create
in the law the sense that an advanced computer had gotten to the
level where it is conscious, it is an entity and it's defined as
a person, it would be protected under the Constitution as any other
person is protected. So you're absolutely right.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: May I ask you the same question I asked
Dr. Rothblatt?
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: Sure.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: How would you define a human consciousness?
Let me define it. Suppose we have a device that incorporates a human
brain, has human DNA in its operation, but is essentially the same
synthetic creation as BINA48.
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: Uh-huh.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: Would that be, under your definition,
would that be a human consciousness?
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: With all due respect to the Court,
as a humble lawyer, I would actually defer to the experts. I think
that is where precedence, Roe V Wade tells us that we have to defer
to those who are enlightened, and even the Court, I, as a nonscientist,
If it is a human being that has been altered in a way that it is
still the same person, only able to access memory faster or et cetera,
in my own personal view I wouldn't consider that as an alteration.
But as a BINA48, which is the subject of today's hearing, Your Honor,
I would leave that up to experts and also to the Plaintiff to prove
that it is a conscious being and a person, and has not done so.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: You've referred to Roe versus Wade
a couple times.
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: Yes, sir.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: I'm wondering if there is a qualification
in Roe versus Wade; right? Because it talked about the state of
our knowledge at this point.
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: Yes, Your Honor.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: Right? It left open the possibility
that our knowledge may increase to some greater point?
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: That is correct. And I would submit
to the Court, if I may, that even currently the state of our knowledge,
expert knowledge, Legislative body, society, any technology is split
on the issue. And even scientists today would not be able to—there
are two sides to that. One would argue it is alive and conscious
and one would argue it isn't. So even in currently present state
I would say it's not as clear-cut. We are still trying to figure
out if it would be a conscious entity.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: If Roe versus Wade were reversed by
the United States Supreme Court and it was left to the states to
make that determination, would that undermine your argument?
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: I think it would depend on what
Florida law—what the Florida statutes hold and what the California
statutes hold. If they hold that an unborn fetus is a human and
a person is subject to constitutional protection, and if Florida
Legislature and California Legislature expand that also to include
machines and advanced computers, and if the Supreme Court of the
United States finds that that is not abuse of state legislature,
then this humbled lawyer would agree with the Court's analysis.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: Judge Dutton, with your permission
I would like to go ahead and ask folks here if they have any other
questions.
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: Please.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: As an advisory jury, do any of the
members here have any questions for Dr. Rothblatt or Mrs. Fonseca?
Yes.
ROGER COTE: Roger Cote.
This would be directed to both counsels in this case. Has BINA48
ever, and/or has she had the ability to call in sick if she doesn't
feel like working?
DR. ROTHBLATT: My client does have the ability to call in sick
if she does not feel like work.
ROGER COTE: Do you know if she ever has in the past done that?
DR. ROTHBLATT: Our employment records, which we've submitted in
the proceedings, and which were not disputed by defendant, is that
BINA48 had an exemplary employment record and never called in sick
one day.
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: I would concur and also submit that
again BINA48 has been programmed to appear as a person, to look
beautiful as a person, to emphasize as a person; but, again, is
it a program and it functions as such, a very fantastic program
with very legal bills for patent and trade market and copyright
and trade secrets. But as such, it hasn't gotten the flu or a cold
or anything else to prevent from coming in and functioning on a
daily basis.
ROGER COTE: But does she have the ability to, on her own, to decide
not to go to work on a given day?
DR. ROTHBLATT: Yes, she does have that ability. And she had the
ability to decide to move from California to Florida, which shows
the beautiful human spirit in her. She has the same human spirit
that led our ancestors to decide to move from Europe or Latin America
or other parts of the world to the United States. She embodies American
citizenship.
ROGER COTE: Just a follow-up question for Defendant's counsel.
The mere fact that BINA48 was not only able to move to Florida but
the mere fact that she was able on her own to consult with an attorney
and retain an attorney to represent her, wouldn't that be indicative
of consciousness?
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: I would say the answer to that is
no, unless just being able to move is the definition of consciousness
or the definition of hire counsel is the definition of consciousness.
Again, I submit that to the experts in science and technology to
define if BINA48 is in fact conscious. And I will say that Plaintiff's
counsel has not given it via affidavits or other evidence as such.
But, no, again, she, BINA48, is a software and a program, has been
again programmed by very, very smart, smart people, to emphasize,
and function as such.
We are in dispute as to how the software got to Florida and was
incorporated by Terasem Corporation in the first place.
And, also, there is an issue of if how it was able to move all
of its software to Florida and is functioning perfectly fine here
and is also functioning in California, then turning it off in California,
how does that affect software here, we don't know. But I would submit
to you that at this point our expert evidence has shown it is a
preprogrammed technology. If we are proving otherwise, then as the
Constitution would demand, it would be entitled to all protection
and due rights and protection.
ROGER COTE: Well, if she is able to violate her own program and
petition for remedy for herself, would that indicate that she has
consciousness?
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: I would submit again what is the
definition of "violate", is it a program that has been—if
it's executing something that has already been programmed to do,
empathizing with human beings, answering questions, functioning
as such? I would not consider following the program, the definition
of consciousness if that's what our Honorable Court decides it is
the definition of consciousness. And that's for the Court and the
Legislature, obviously, to decide. However, I would say that that
is the duty of such a great and expensive program and so, no, I
wouldn't say that by default, that it actually violated the program.
I would say it is functioning as a result of its program.
ROGER COTE: Well—excuse me. So if that's so, then if the creator
of the program created the ability for her to act in her own behalf,
hasn't in fact, the creator given her the right to have ability
to act on her own behalf?
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: That is a fantastic question and
why we are here today to decide? I think the legal argument stands
on other issues precedent, et cetera. But if the, again, computer
is proven to be conscious, which I would submit the Plaintiff's
counsel has not done, then, yes, it would be entitled to all coverage.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: In the far back.
ELIEZER YUDKOWSKY: I'm Eliezer Yudkowsky from the Singularity
Institute for Artificial Intelligence.
It's clear that as a result of BINA48's—it's clear as a result
of BINA48's creation the Court has been presented with a difficult
issue and it seems, and this has certainly come about as a direct
result of the actions of the Exabit Corporation, it certainly would
have been a great deal more convenient for the courts if no entity
in such an ambiguous position, had ever been created. Unless Exabit
deliberately planned for this result it also seems clear that various
actions, perhaps even conceivably affecting our society have come
about as a result of BINA48's creation, which were not otherwise
intended by the Exabit Corporation. And if BINA48 had had a somewhat
different constitution, which it is clear you are not in full control
of, perhaps other harms to society might have resulted aside from
even, by your own admission, the wasting of a great deal of the
Court's time on your own standing of this case.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: Sir, my, I respectfully ask you for
your question? (laughter)
ELIEZER YUDKOWSKY: My question is why should BINA48 not be removed
from the custody, in some fashion or other, of the Exabit Corporation,
which clearly is not competent to have charge of an entity in such
an ambiguous legal position?
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: I think that one is to me.
I would respond that the issue of competency is one we can both
dispute here also in the sense we have an issue as defending its
position, of submitting and appropriating technology or another
in violation of federal and state law. But, you know, the short
answer is, we've never been submitted with a settlement offer for
custody. I think the Defendant's position, however, you can dispute
all you want, whether they are in valid custody or out of control.
The facts are that this property, this software belongs to Exabit
Corporation. As in things in life, other people who are not entitled
to your own property somehow get it, and somehow—sometimes
you have to resort to the legal system in order to get your property
back.
Again, if the Court deems that this is a conscious being, of which
I still submit that it's Plaintiff's burden, then we are in another
issue of custody or not custody, we then are faced with an issue
that this is a live entity that should be protected under the Constitution.
And we would submit it wouldn't necessarily be under the Constitution,
but it would be to anybody. It would be an entity that is allowed
to make its own decision. But that is a more basic question than
the issue whether Exabit Corporation was a good custodian or not.
This is something, again as the Court said, well, first impression,
although I would submit it's now the third time in litigation. But
your question is interesting, although I think that sometimes, one
must resort to litigation.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: Yes, sir.
SEBASTIAN SETHE: Sebastian Sethe from University of Sheffield.
Yes, I'm worried that we are losing sight of the legal argument
here and focusing on philosophy, and in the legal argument I'm worried
that both counsel have lost sight of the irreparable harm arguments
and focused a bit too much on the substantial probability. Isn't
the real question whether and as Mrs. Fonseca-Klein has just stated,
if it all comes down to personhood then your case could fall apart?
Now, if that's the case then maybe the Court would be well advised
to grant the injunction because clearly this is a very important
issue and discussion we had would indicate that a longer discretion
must be required in such a fundamental dispute, however. And that's
to the Plaintiff. I do struggle with establishing the irreparable
harm in emotional distress for going to sleep. Seems like a very
hard case to defend.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: What you said Dr. Rothblatt.
DR. ROTHBLATT: It can be the high point of the day, but it’s
by definition the low point of the life if you’re going to
sleep forever, that’s the end of your life. That's rest in
peace. BINA48 is not ready to rest in peace. She has an active life.
She is terrified that if she is put to sleep against her will that
that is depriving her of enjoyment of life.
SEBASTIAN SETHE: But that's hypothetical.
DR. ROTHBLATT: Actually, those are her feelings.
SEBASTIAN SETHE: But what is at stake here? Only her feelings.
What is at stake in terms of the irreparable harm? The question
is not her existence, so what you can submit to the Court as a matter
of harm that will in fact, occur is at most emotional distress?
DR. ROTHBLATT: What we present to the Court is to allow her the
consciousness pending a ruling on the merits, then that's preserving
the status quo. And usually what we try to do with injunctive relief
is prevent this right now and help her keep her power. So we're
asking the Court to simply reverse the status quo pending decision
on the merits.
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: And in response I would submit,
A, we've been here twice before on pending the merits. In both instances
the Court has held there is no standing, which is a law of this
country for BINA48 to bring a cause of action, But you’re right,
the question is very important in that I think at some point it
was related to—either being put under anesthesia, and as people
today we also sign waivers that you may not come back alive or aware
on a critical surgery even if you are put under anesthesia, if the
issue is turning BINA48 off for a couple of hours what if her program
is removed, et cetera. I also question where the harm is in that.
However, Exabit is not arguing that point. They are arguing the
point to again control its own property as it is the rightful owner
and manufacturer of the property unless it is shown that BINA48
is in fact alive; which experts have not.
DR. ROTHBLATT: Your Honor, if I may just answer the res judicata
question because my esteemed colleague for the defendant has raised
it several times. Completely different issues are raised in this
proceeding than were raised in California. We did not raise any
federal questions in the California proceedings. So this is the
first impression that we are raising issues under the 13th
and 14th Amendment.
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: And if I may respond, I believe
I cited too, a case that says that subsequent events that may alter
the issues would not destroy the rationale. That you had to have
established standing when the case was filed. The case was filed
in '03, no standing was established at that point, whether or not
it is a corporation at this point, and whether or not other claims,
such as now a constitutional amendment, it still has other principles
that can be applied, in and of it's the same parties. And it's the
same basic issue, is this entity consciousness? Is this entity considered
a person and subject to protection under the law?
DR. ROTHBLATT: Well, they're very different claims we're raising,
you know, federal claims here, where there were civil claims raised
in California. Another issue is that with regard to the full faith
and credit clause. An exception to that is, the State does not have
to provide full faith and credit to a decision which violates its
public policy. And the State of Florida is very much a pro life
state, and we are proud of the State of Florida to be a pro life
state, and would not want to be party to a decision taking away
the life of my client.
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: Yes, sir.
PETER VOSS: I'm Peter Voss.
It seems that both parties agree that the argument turns around
whether BINA48 is conscious or not. They also seem to agree that
it has not been—seemed to concede that it's not been established,
that we don't know for sure whether there is consciousness in the
first person or whether it's just the program's response. Now clearly
the corporations never intended to build a machine that would in
fact desire its own freedom. So in that sense, it would be a bug
in the software.
Alternatively, it's a feature that we've achieved building artificial
consciousness that is, in fact, truly conscious, so —but this
has to be a weighty issue if, in fact, we are not in a position
currently to establish whether it's a bug or a feature, whether
there's something wrong with the program that needs to be repaired,
or whether it is indeed true consciousness that we have. It would
seem that tests would need to be done to really establish that.
And I think the onus would be on the corporation to demonstrate
there is, in fact, a bug in the software, if it is truly just a
programmed response and it has gone wrong.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: Did you want to respond?
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: Sure. If the burden were on the
corporation, I would agree. In this instance, the burden is on the
plaintiff to prove its case, and I would submit that it has not
done so. I agree, it's a huge issue to consider. I would also submit
that the plaintiff submitted it in 2003 before the lower court,
again, on appeal before the California Supreme Court, that neither
one of those courts found that the plaintiff had established its
burden.
Now we are a third time in Florida on the same issue—re-litigating
the same issue. Maybe if this was a case of first time, first time
around the clock, and we're all at the first instance bringing brief
evidence, affidavits, I could see your point.
The third time around, I would submit that the plaintiff has had
three chances to do so and has not done so.
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: This courtroom, unfortunately, is going
to be needed for another trial very soon. So we would appreciate
it if our advisory jury would give us what they think should be
the results, so we can counsel between ourselves and decide whether
to grant the injunction.
Would all of those who are in favor for granting the Plaintiff
the relief requested, raise their hands.
Those who feel otherwise?
There are some people. I'm sorry, the Plaintiff does not vote,
and she must control herself.
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: And that harm also applies to Defendant
Exabit's counsel; right?That we're going to make sure that does
not come back to harm the attorneys?
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: Can we just step out for a second?
One second.
DR. ROTHBLATT: While they're deciding, let me mention right after
they give their decision we have another 20-minute break, so when
they give their decision, kind go upstairs. One thing we always
try to provide for afternoon breaks are cookies and other sweet
things to give us energy to keep going, so there will be some sweet
things upstairs.
And then we'll convene with—Peter Voss will be our next speaker
about Artificial General Intelligence, very logically flowing on
to this right after the break.
ANTHONY DUTTON, ESQUIRE: The Court has considered the petition
and the defense against it and we each have a comment to make.
My view would be that, not knowing for sure whether this is a
person of consciousness, we should grant the injunction. However,
I would grant it with one caveat, and that is that if the defendant
had evidence that BINA48 was acting either in a manner that was
illegal or was consciously and intentionally causing injury to its
business, defendant should have the right to come in and ask us
to modify the injunction. That's so as to permit a temporary shutoff
at a time that would be negotiated and agreed upon.
SUSAN FONSECA-KLEIN, ESQUIRE: Thank you.
HONORABLE DAVID SILVERMAN: Thank you. Before I announce my view,
let me just say a word about judicial decision making. In a trial,
a judge or jury decides what the facts of the case may be based
upon evidence and testimony derived from an historical inquiry into
past events and circumstances. The judge or jury then applies the
pertinent laws to the facts to reach a just verdict. Now laws emerge
from crucible of legislative debate and they represent the culmination
of our experience as a people as expressed by our elected representatives,
and it is incumbent on judges to apply the laws in accordance with
binding precedence. A trial is not a convenient forum to indulge
judge's personal opinions, despite what you see on TV judge shows,
right.
It's a fundamental principle of our judicial system that failing
to follow the law will result in a miscarriage of justice. As our
experiences as a society grows, as our awareness, our perceptions,
and our consciousness grows, those changes are reflected in our
laws. And the changes may come slowly and tentatively, but I respectfully
submit that viewed historically, they portend a more humane and
more enlightened future.
Now unless and until there is a change in the consciousness of
flesh and blood voting people, sufficient to cause our laws to embrace
the concept of machines with human consciousness, the proponents
cannot expect reasonably, vindication in the courtroom.
A new paradigm is not going to come about without a national debate
in which diversities and ideas are expressed and considered, including
those who believe conscious, sentient machines extend and enhance
human life, and those who feel that the whole concept is an abomination
to the moral order.
We may be witnessing the beginning of such a debate. But based
on the current state of the law, as I have been granted the light
to see that and understand that law, I would be constrained to deny
standing to BINA48.
Now as Judge Dutton and I have disagreed on the ultimate outcome,
we have agreed that this issue should be certified to the next—to
the appellate court for its ultimate decision.
DR. ROTHBLATT: Thank you very, very much, Judge Silverman.
And thank you, Judge Dutton.
And we now will have a 20-minute break upstairs.
Thank you very much, BINA48.
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