|
|
From The Enlightenment to N-Lightenment
The criminal potentials inherent in molecular manufacturing include powerful new illegal drugs, mass murder via compromised assembly codes, and a "killer virus" crossing out of cyberspace into the physical realm. A criminal-justice futurist examines the possibilities.
On top of my physical desk sits
a copy of Pandaemonium: The Coming of the Machine as Seen by Contemporary
Observers, 1660-1886, Humphrey Jennings’ “imaginative
history of the Industrial Revolution.” On my computer desktop
are essays by the authors of this volume (and the previous one1),
the possible precursors of Pan-nano-daemonium: The Coming of the
Micro-Machine.
In one of those essays, “The Need for Limits,” Chris
Phoenix speaks of the Enlightenment in terms of a synergy: enhanced
human productivity with machines, partially supporting a philosophical
examination of the human condition. Though certainly that, the Enlightenment
also was a watershed period when the economic foundations of the
European economy changed, and the authority of Revealed Truth was
forced to contend with the authority of Rational Thought and its
practical cousin, Scientific Inquiry. The shifts in the economy
created a massive transformation of social life, from agrarian to
urban. The current era has parallels to all of these forces, movements
already in play but not yet complete...and in some cases not fully
articulated.
As a peripheral member of a futurists group2 in my professional
field (policing, and more broadly, criminal justice), I have noticed
that futurists tend to be concerned with the end results of trends,
the state of things ten, twenty, or fifty years from now. By contrast,
I am more concerned with the collateral damage we may sustain in
the process of getting to those future states from where we are
now.
This essay approaches that interstitial state in four sections.
The first section looks at the control of the technology; the second,
for the criminal potentials inherent in it. Using the template of
the Enlightenment, the third section looks at the darker channels
of social transformation, particularly the impact on work and social
worth. The fourth section draws an admittedly leap-of-faith parallel
between the Enlightenment’s impact on religious authority,
and technology’s impact upon the authority of economic capital
and law.
Nanotechnology holds remarkable potential to change the world,
but like most recent technologies, it emerges within a larger system
of laws, codes of conduct, and social expectations developed for
previous capacities. Those mechanisms will shape its emerging uses,
possibly retarding or constraining the applications of the technology
in undesirable ways. At issue is whether micro-level processing
will be merely one more tool (and thus alter our lives incrementally),
or a Promethean breakthrough that will alter human existence in
profound ways. My interest, as one who stands outside the Halls
of Science looking in, tends to center on the possibilities that
I can understand from a layman’s perspective.
Trying to grasp in layman’s terms the implications of a new
and only marginally understood technology leads to a search for
analogies, framing the new in terms of the familiar (for good or
ill).
Control
As a non-scientist, the most salient question for me is, “When
do I get to play with the new toy?” Given the general limits
of corporate use of nanotechnology, the first new toy that will
become available to me most likely will be the desktop assembler,
or personal nanofactory (PN).
The most knowledgeable members of CRN’s Global Task Force3
have engaged in a lengthy discussion about desktop manufacturing
and its social consequences, and as of this writing, there seems
to be a lack of consensus about the capacity, and thus the full
impact, of PNs. If we accept the position of the optimists, and
expect fully-capable devices to be available in the not-too-distant
future, secondary questions arise: Will the devices be provided
in fully-capable form (probably transformative), or will their functionality
be curtailed in defense of the corporate profits to be derived from
them? If the latter, how will control be maintained? Some answers
are perhaps to be found in current trends, since the courts often
look to historical analogs in dealing with new issues.
If we posit that desktop manufacturing becomes widely available,
as seems inevitable, the dominant forces of the economy have two
avenues of recourse to maintain control over the new technology
for monetary benefit. The first will be the control of raw materials
for molecular assembly, which appears to share the delivery profile
of heating fuels in contemporary life. More important is the second
area, already suggested by Phoenix: patents and copyrights.4
The development of nanotechnology is taking place within a corporate
nest of ideas and resources (much like licensed computer software
development), with some independent researchers and consortia operating
on a freeware basis. Molecular assembly at any sort of commercial
or individual level will require patterns to guide assembly, and
these are likely to be controlled by patents. The majority of patents
are almost certain to be controlled by corporate interests. Renewable
user site licenses, comparable to commercial software packages,
are the most likely form of retaining economic benefit for a corporate
entity. One of the possible ways of maintaining economic control
over site licenses would be some form of cyber-degradable program
that self-destructs after a finite period, and must be renewed.
For example, a user could download (or purchase on a one-use or
renewable-use media platform) the code that would allow the manufacture
of only a certain number of rolls of toilet paper by a personal
nanofactory.
Patents and the fundamental premises of intellectual property are
already under challenge, but the challenges have been met with an
equally strong legal response anchored in precedent. The courts
have handed the reins of control over digital recordings of music
to the star-making machinery behind the popular songs through conservative
interpretation of intellectual property statutes. The huge profits
to be made from licensing technological advancements for industry
virtually assures that the field of nanotechnology will be similarly
bound.
The most recent Promethean technology, file-sharing, theoretically
stood to liberate music from the chains of capital. However, Napster,
Kaaza, Grokster, and their lesser clones have lost the legal battles,
and the technology has been co-opted by industry giants into new
distribution-for-profit mechanisms. Corporations and universities
alike write eminent domain over patents and patentable discoveries
into their employment contracts, and genetic patterns and discoveries
are subject to copyright. Unknown garage bands and the metaphorical
garage workshops of independent researchers still can be found beyond
the current reach of over-grasping capital, but only until they
become good or useful enough to attract attention.
As new genetic “building block” discoveries and other
chemical compounds are placed under patent, the copyright has become
the new castle moat or the new dog in the manger (depending upon
one’s perspective), intended to keep easily-duplicated “properties”
under the control of their owners. Paradoxically, only those products
deemed legitimate are defended by patents and lawsuits so vigorously;
illegal products and contraband are not. Corporate interests have
far deeper pockets and a true metric for measuring loss and injury.
There is greater freedom in the illicit trades, where control of
trafficked, harmful artifacts rests with hugely inefficient, underfunded,
and understaffed public enforcement agencies.
The exponential explosion of child pornography (and its hate- and
racial supremacy-based counterparts) over the Internet is a cautionary
tale in its own right. Like the illicit drug trade in the physical
world, neither child porn nor hate-mongering is impervious to law
enforcement efforts, but the occasional victories of enforcement
seem to have little long-term effect on the larger industry or movement.
The underground distribution of molecular patterns for assembly
might easily be accomplished by the same mechanisms, like the basic
virus codes that any script-kiddie can download, tinker with, and
release back into the wild.
While the first generation of personal nanofactories probably will
come with a fixed number of pre-programmed patterns, market forces
will demand versatility. Units will need a capacity to acquire new
assembly patterns as they are developed, and there seem to be few
options beyond what is now available for computer data. Patterns
may be downloaded over hardwired or Wi-Fi networks, or be manually
transferred by whatever media replace the current disk drives and
flash memory sticks. Each format would spawn a black market of unknown
proportions, and with the black markets come the accompanying risks
of epidemic and pandemic consequences of criminal use.
Criminal Potentials
We should anticipate that a new drug industry will piggyback on
the basic molecular assembly phenomenon, and the potential implications
for the social fabric are enormous. One of the most desirable benefits
of nanotechnology is that of precise targeting of therapeutic drugs;
however, the same technology will have associated benefits for illegal
pharmacopoeia. While the complexity of the patterns most likely
will delay this until a second or third-level level of PN development,
once the basic patterns for psychotropic drugs are understood and
the assembly technology sufficiently enabled, individual drug manufacture
is almost certain to become a social tsunami. There are strong analogies
to the current methamphetamine epidemic: less than two decades ago,
the manufacture of crystal methamphetamine required a well-equipped
clandestine lab, a chemist, a criminal organization for protection
and distribution. Today, meth is the new bathtub gin, easily made
in any number of Rube Goldberg processes in basements, trailers,
campers, garages, or pickup trucks.
Unlike methamphetamine, a micro-assembly drug manufacture process
would need only the basic molecular components, not the more elaborate
precursor chemicals (like pseudoephedrine) whose control is now
part of our anti-drug strategy. That suggests a much greater availability,
with corollary hazards of greater social experimentation and conceivably
even poly-drug experimentation. The toxic byproducts of meth labs
are threats to law enforcement agencies, the families of meth addicts,
and neighborhoods. We do not yet know the degree to which micro-manufacture
byproducts will be toxic, if at all.
Illicit micro-manufacture may be a mixed blessing. On the one hand,
effectively eliminating organized crime from the market may lessen
the toxic effects of the war on drugs: the corruption involved with
importation of drugs, and the violence of competing drug markets.
At least potentially, even the criminogenic nature of drug dependency
may be lessened: since the base materials would likely be the same
as for legitimate micro-manufacture, it is less likely that a specialized,
higher-priced supply chain would be necessary. The dynamics of that
supply chain create additional crimes: violence among criminal enterprises
competing for turf high, and both personal and property crime committed
by addicts desperate to meet the dealer’s price. Absent the
supply market, the cost of personally manufactured drugs would be
cheaper, and the risks of their creation considerably lower in terms
of legal discovery and interdiction. However, the potential free
access to addictive and mind-altering substances will almost certainly
exacerbate the social problems associated with the addictions and
dependencies that result. The same delivery method could surreptitiously
create markets for new designer drugs, addictive and involuntarily
piggybacked on legitimately disseminated nanoproduct codes. The
number of “what ifs” that need to be resolved before either
scenario happens leave the possibilities within the realm of fiction
for now, but if the analogies to the Internet hold true, they must
be anticipated as a contingency.
Should we ever develop a drug-based cure for the addictions, of
course, it might be to our collective advantage to attempt to disseminate
it via whatever outlaw networks and mechanisms develop, the angelic
counterpart to the demonic assault-by-micro-drugs of the original
scenario. Therapeutic nano-rehab, even at the time of a medical
crisis, may not be sufficient to stem the drug crisis, however.
Involuntary detoxification has a poor history of neutralizing the
psychological dependencies that drive post-sobriety returns to addictive
substances. The “evil twin” of involuntary detoxification
is involuntary addiction.
Lurking beyond therapeutic use is the possibility of totalitarian
control using the same methods. The Promethean paradox that attends
all new technologies is even more pronounced for those that escape
Newtonian-level detection. Medical research is racing ahead in its
understanding of neural processes, including the sites in the brain
responsible for certain behaviors. As nanomedicine develops capacities
for intervening in psychological dependencies or other maladies,
it also develops the capacity for inducing mind control or other
forms of incapacitation.
Downstream, there is also the potential for mass murder via compromised
assembly codes. In the physical world, tainting a medicine with
poison can only be done efficiently at the factory source, and even
then must bypass or defeat stringent quality control measures. Any
other corruption can take place only on a relatively small scale.
The introduction of a virulent and unsuspected corruption of a drug
assembly code is not so limited. It shares more in common with the
computer virus than the Tylenol poisoner. Since black market codes
originate and enter the data stream outside the domain of legitimate
quality control measures, and the drug-using community is unlikely
to give designer drug codes great scrutiny (at least in the initial
rounds), “massassination” (mass assassination or “pharmaceutical
cleansing”) via bogus codes is a distinct possibility in a
networked distribution system. It would challenge both medical institutions
and law enforcement agents. It is admittedly an outside possibility,
requiring a rare combination of technological savvy and social alienation,
but the world since September 2001 has been dealing with more and
more “one in a bazillion” scenarios. Nothing should be
taken off the table in terms of exploring, and preparing for, unpleasant
misappropriation of technology.
To a certain degree, the massassination scenario depends upon the
nature of the dissemination of manufacture codes. The most logical
assumption is that distribution of product blueprints for desktop
manufacturing will be done via the Internet or its successor entity.
The current attempts to defeat music and film pirate copies would
have serious analogs in any new process that challenged traditional
sources of corporate and investment income, especially unrestricted
use of molecular assembly technology. The Spy vs. Spy battle between
corporate interests and hacktivism will doubtless continue in the
nano- and micro-arenas as in cyberspace. Even if controls evolve
another way, such as physical distribution of codes on one-use portable
media like the flash memory stick, markets for stolen and counterfeit
products will emerge, just as the current computer viruses and malware
are piggybacked on the legitimate use of the Internet. Beating security
encryptions to transform a one-use code into a version capable of
electronic dissemination will be an instant challenge for the criminal
and black-hat hacking communities.
There are some differences, though. While the viruses and Trojan
horses that hector cyberspace have consequences ranging from irritating
(the Blue Screen of Death) to life-changing (severe financial crises
resulting from identity theft), it is only at the most extreme range
that they could be considered life-threatening. Identity theft that
labels an innocent citizen as a dangerous criminal has some potential
for creating life-threatening situations, but most of the jeopardy
is financial or social. Viruses and worms may take down a network
or three, or transform the World Wide Web into the World Wide Wait
with deleterious consequences for commerce, but they do not directly
assault the networks’ users. A corrupted, mislabeled, or maliciously
designed micro-manufacture code could “break the fourth wall,”
crossing out of cyberspace into the physical realm.
The closest parallel in the physical world, the batch of bad heroin
that kills users in clusters, does not really provide an accurate
analog for a malicious assembly code incident. Relatively few seek
heroin under any circumstances, and no one but the most desperate
heroin addict would seek out bad heroin (as has happened in some
isolated cases). The first “killer virus” loose in whatever
network provides product codes for PNs will affect hundreds and
perhaps thousands of innocents, whether it comes as a terrorist
strike or an unintended consequence of a hacking adventure. No one
will have to seek it: once in the wild, it will arrive unbidden
in the In Box.
Defenses to such a scenario potentially exist, but security measures
are one of the most attractive fruits of the Tree of Knowledge.
Like contemporary Internet defenses, and the laws passed to outlaw
new designer drugs, defensive maneuvers almost always stimulate
new offensive attacks. Any combination of zeros and ones, in any
transportation medium, can be hijacked and compromised: the track
record of Internet security does not bode well for the free and
easy commercial transfer of assembly codes for the molecules-up
creation of products.
Social
During the Industrial Revolution in England, improved agricultural
efficiencies accelerated the process of enclosure, dislocating the
rural population no longer needed for raising and harvesting crops.
Simultaneous improvements in the production of iron and steel, in
weaving, and other areas began to transform cottage industries into
factory-based industries, and urbanization rapidly changed the face
of the country. The nature of trade shifted from one-off mercantile
ventures and royal charters to stable capital for long-term ventures.
Factory industries supplanted cottage industries, local artisans,
and craft guilds, but the concentration of work in brick-and-mortar
containers still left some out of work: the notorious “surplus
labor” that kept wages low. The expansion of the new manufacturing
base managed to absorb surplus labor for some time, until the advent
of widespread robotics in the second half of the twentieth century.
A robust generation of personal nanofactories may very well bifurcate
commerce into those items that can be manufactured at home and those
which still must be purchased through the familiar retail supply
chains. While a certain amount of jobs will be created around the
transportation of raw materials for PNs, they will be paltry in
comparison to the jobs the devices displace in manufacture, transport,
and sales. Globalization has already imposed a certain amount of
social dislocation in the manufacturing sectors; a maturing nanotechnology
could very well trigger a long-term social dislocation not seen
since the English migration from the newly-enclosed farmlands to
the new factories of the Industrial Revolution.
The need for human labor seems to be diminishing at an accelerated
rate inverse to Ray Kurzweil’s description5 of the advance
of technology. The shift from human muscle to animal muscle took
millennia; from animal to human-guided mechanical, centuries; from
human-guided to robotic, decades; and the emergence of computer-directed
manufacture seems measured in years if not months. Human society,
however, still is anchored in a near-medieval paradigm where social
worth is measured by the type and extent of work one engages in.
The pecking order of work starts at the menial and dirty level,
maids and animal rendering and manual labor (the province of illegal
immigrants and paroled convicts) comparable to carrying the hod.
The next step up is the marginally cleaner and less taxing “service
economy” of McJobs, which jousts with the decline of blue-collar
union-affiliated manufacturing jobs for the next higher rung (salaries
and benefits alone give the advantage to unionized jobs, regardless
of the decades-long decline in union membership, though the recent
perturbations in the airline and automobile industries in particular,
and corporate pension plans generally, leave even that in doubt).
Above that are the traditional white-collar jobs, but the new aristocracy—sharply
defined by the accelerating concentration of wealth in at least
American society—is comprised of those who “let their
money work for them,” the investing class, the owners of the
means of production.
Work is devalued in other ways: in the symbolic change of language
in which employees are now called “associates,” with a
presumed stake in the corporate success that is not mirrored anywhere
in the reward system; in the stock market rewarding corporate actions
that trim the workforce; and in the precipitous erosion of industry-sponsored
pensions. Human labor has been, or is in the process of being, effectively
decoupled from the part of the economy that is valued. The long-term
consequences of this are by no means clear, but the advent of a
personal –nanofactories will not necessarily create a widespread
leisure class.
Another of the volumes on my physical desktop is William Julius
Wilson’s When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban
Poor. It deals with the “left behind” problem of those
under a double burden of low social status and of being dependent
upon jobs in industries that have moved elsewhere (to Alabama, to
Mexico, or to China). While the analogy to a nanotechnology shift
need not be exact, Wilson’s depictions and analyses offer a
powerful warning we may need to confront within a generation: what
are the social consequences when there are no alternative employment
outlets for surplus labor? American history of the 20th
century holds small hope that our social attitudes will change rapidly:
the unemployed, underemployed, and “idle” always have
been despised for not somehow rising above the crushing weight of
social and economic forces beyond their control. Revolution traditionally
has been pointless or counterproductive, and Cite Soliel endures
in its multiple forms around the globe despite the potential and
promises of globalization, the Green Revolution, and countless other
advances.
It is tempting to suggest that nano-communes, with internal self-sufficiency
that leaven the worst effects of industrial-era unemployment, will
free the human spirit for more cerebral endeavors. Futures are almost
never equally distributed when they arrive, and Utopian dreams of
that kind have a history of being measured in months rather than
decades or eras. It is difficult to envision the rise of a labor
movement comparable to those of nineteenth-century Britain and the
United States; it is almost easier to predict the widespread distribution
of limited-capacity PNs as a form of social welfare (and social
placation of the underclass).
Larger questions arise out of this potential for increased social
marginality. The income gap between rich and poor has been widening
for more than two decades. Globalization has transformed the American
economy, and the household economy has suffered as a result. The
degree to which nanotechnology, the Internet, and other technologies
accelerate or buffer the social decoupling of work and status is
still an undiscovered country. If the cumulative effect is acceleration,
we need to anticipate the range of human adaptations that will follow.
If one no longer is attached in any meaningful way to an economy
and the political ideology that supports it, how long can that authority
hold one’s allegiance? And what are the alternatives if the
allegiance cannot otherwise be reinforced?
Authority
Although it is a commonplace to think of religious worship as timeless,
it actually undergoes periodic major shifts, often triggered by
secular events. In the first century of the Common Era, the nature
of revelation itself was transformed from the direct presence of
a transcendent deity to the interpretation of a written Scripture.
For Jews, the destruction of the Holy of Holies in the Second Temple
ended the traditional direct contact of the High Priests. For Christians,
the sudden absence of their Messiah from the streets of Jerusalem
transformed the Judaic concept of messianic return into an entirely
new understanding the relationship between human beings and their
Creator.
The struggle for primacy between the Catholic Church and secular
governments began soon after Christianity was adopted as the official
religion of the Roman Empire. It continued through the Investiture
Controversy of the Middle Ages, and was the decisive factor in the
success of the Reformation. However, the waning of the dominance
of religion was a process begun centuries earlier by resistance
(“heresy”) within the Church itself, beginning with the
Great Schism of the Eastern Orthodox traditions. The purification
movements that created monastic orders within the Church presaged
the later coming of the Reformation, which relocated purifying reform
outside the Church and ended the sole authority of Rome to arbitrate
Christian salvation. The secular challenges arising from the Enlightenment
remain at play in the contemporary questions of Church and State,
Science and Belief, and authority to define human relations. Increasing
secularity jousts with the rise of fundamentalism and of sects,
undermining traditional “mainstream” churches.
Whether the maturing of nanotechnology will impact the continuing
struggle of religious authority is unclear. The potential is there,
certainly, as the manipulation of matter at the molecular level
comes perilously close to “playing God,” especially where
it might affect what it means to be human. Artificial intelligence,
genetic engineering, and cybernetic enhancements pose imminent challenges
to the religious understandings of “human,” and nanotechnology
bids to play a major role within each of those technologies. Public
discourse in areas where the definitions of “life” are
most contended are fueled as much by symbolism and metaphor as by
science; misapprehensions and misunderstandings about nanotechnology
may well be fuel for new battlefronts in what has been dubbed “the
culture wars.”
During the Reformation, the monolithic authority of the Church
of Rome was transformed into a limited number of Protestant denominations.
The existence of each one allowed anyone to resist the Authority
of the Catholic Church, and beyond that, the authority of any other
church. (The earliest attempt to incorporate a denial of secular
authority, under the banner of “No Bishops, No Barons,”
was ruthlessly suppressed by secular forces, whose worldly enforcement
had more immediate clout than the afterlife of religion.) The transformation
of monolithic Authority into micro-authority created a market for
allegiances. The old concept of rules defined and enforced by a
monopolistic Church—enforced by excommunication, the denial
of sacraments, and the resulting condemnation to an infernal afterlife—gave
way to a free market of ideas and selection of, rather than submission
to, authority that continues to this day. Catholic priests who wish
to marry may find refuge in the Anglican communion. Protestant churches
may fracture over rules of control and worship, and denominations
may enter schism over ecclesiastical matters, as witness the current
strain in the Anglican communion over the issue of gay bishops and
clergy, and the social acceptance of homosexuality. Other issues
less anchored in scriptural interpretation, like finances, may also
trigger the sundering of ways for a congregation.
Using this as an analogy for secular considerations, it is an interesting
exercise in speculation to consider whether nanotechnology generally,
and desktop manufacturing in particular, will lead to nano-communes
that eventually decouple individuals from the larger economy and
the political system so closely tied to it. Such communities would
be the natural descendants of the self-sufficient medieval monastic
orders, the utopian communities of the mid-1800s, and the communes
of the 1960s and beyond. Unlike their predecessors, they could be
“off the grid” in important ways, but not necessarily
withdrawn from the larger society.
In other realms, there is some additional promise in the potential
for using nanotechnology as a recycling outlet. Molecular disassembly
as a precursor to molecular assembly may be a completely different
set of technological difficulties, and raises a series of questions
about disposal of nonessential elements. The Newtonian-world vision
of a methane burnoff is impractical at the molecular level, and
the state of byproduct disposal is unclear at this point. If unwanted
matter can be converted to energy, and stored for use, nanotechnology
could change the nature of both recycling and of power. If each
household ran on a “green power” combination of solar
energy and molecular conversions, entire industries might be transformed.
It stretches the imagination a bit to think that factories could
be powered with wind, solar, and nano power, so the traditional
power industries might not disappear, but important sectors might
achieve relative independence from them.
At the same time, the intellectual property forces would still
work to bind nanobased anything to the existing corporate world.
If nano goes “into the wild,” via bootleg or Robin Hood
dissemination, it could weaken the corporate hold, inspire a widespread
law enforcement crackdown on piracy, or dissolve society into above-ground
and Morlock-like subcultures that coexist because they have little
reason to compete. In any of these scenarios, nanotechnology by
itself is not an actor: it is a tool of other interests, and its
impacts are dampened or enhanced by the decisions of social engineering
and politics. But if the end result is the alienation of large masses
of citizens from the engines of the economy and the icons of government,
the costs and secondary developments will be far ranging.
Nanotechnology has its own limits. A host of major decisions in
the social realm will not be changed to any great degree by nanotechnology.
It will not protect the Arctic Natural Wildlife Refuge (indeed,
if natural gas is the first and basic fuel for desktop manufacturing,
it may exacerbate the pressures on the ANWR), nor will it stop the
denuding of the Amazon rain forest. It will not eliminate prejudice,
nor resolve the multiple questions of authority and Authority that
attend the modern estate of humankind. We can predict safely that
when this particular future of mature nanotechnology arrives, it
will not be equally distributed, and may easily be a weapon of social
dominance rather than the delivery vehicle of social equity. Even
the utopian visions of Gene Roddenberry included a period of troubled
dystopia, which Alvin Toffler captured in Future Shock: “the
premature arrival of the future... the imposition of a new culture
on an old one” that results in “human beings.... increasingly
disoriented, progressively incompetent to deal with their environments.”
Which leaves me almost where I began: What do I make of this nanotechnology
thing? I suspect it will be very much like its predecessors, a potentially
transformative technology that will be bound on the bed of Procrustes
of the older social and economic systems that midwifed it. Because
of that, it has considerable potential to be more Pandora’s
Box than Holy Grail in the early going. Assuming that its byproducts
do not poison the groundwater or become an airborne grey goo, it
will almost have to achieve an outlaw status (or its more egalitarian
potential championed by those who will be deemed outlaws) before
it reaches a socially transformative cusp. In the near term, whether
I buy it in a store or make it with my nanofactory, I will still
have to pay for toilet paper.
Michael Buerger, an Associate Professor of Criminal Justice
at Bowling Green State University and a former police officer, is
a member of the Futures Working Group, a collaboration between the
FBI and the Society of Police Futurists International. His broad
interests mainly concern the impact of large-scale social changes
and reactions to them.
1 Nanotechnology Perceptions: A Review of Ultraprecision
Engineering and Nanotechnology (Collegium Basilea, Basel, Switzerland),
Volume 2, Number 1a
2 The Futures Working Group, a collaboration between
the FBI and the Society of Police Futurists International (http://www.policefuturists.org/futures/fwg.htm)
3 Global Task Force on Implications and Policy (http://www.crnano.org/CTF.htm),
organized by the Center for Responsible Nanotechnology
4 “The Need For Limits” (http://kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0651.html)
5 The Singularity is Near (http://singularity.com/)
| | |