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Will Machines Become Conscious? >
My Question for Edge: Who am I? What am I?
Permanent link to this article: http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0376.html
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My Question for Edge: Who am I? What am I?
Since we constantly changing, are we just patterns? What if someone copies that pattern? Am I the original and/or the copy? Ray Kurzweil responds to Edge publisher/editor John Brockman's request to futurists to pose "hard-edge" questions that "render visible the deeper meanings of our lives, redefine who and what we are."
Originally written January 13, 2002. Published at Edge and published on KurzweilAI.net January 14, 2002.
Perhaps I am this stuff here, i.e., the ordered and chaotic collection of molecules that comprise my body and brain.
But there's a problem. The specific set of particles that comprise my body and brain are completely different from the atoms and molecules than comprised me only a short while (on the order of weeks) ago. We know that most of our cells are turned over in a matter of weeks. Even those that persist longer (e.g., neurons) nonetheless change their component molecules in a matter of weeks.
So I am a completely different set of stuff than I was a month ago. All that persists is the pattern of organization of that stuff. The pattern changes also, but slowly and in a continuum from my past self. From this perspective I am rather like the pattern that water makes in a stream as it rushes past the rocks in its path. The actual molecules (of water) change every millisecond, but the pattern persists for hours or even years.
So, perhaps we should say I am a pattern of matter and energy that persists in time.
But there is a problem here as well. We will ultimately be able to scan and copy this pattern in a at least sufficient detail to replicate my body and brain to a sufficiently high degree of accuracy such that the copy is indistinguishable from the original (i.e., the copy could pass a "Ray Kurzweil" Turing test). I won't repeat all the arguments for this here, but I describe this scenario in a number of documents including the essay "The Law of Accelerating Returns" (see The Law of Accelerating Returns).
The copy, therefore, will share my pattern. One might counter that we may not get every detail correct. But if that is true, then such an attempt would not constitute a proper copy. As time goes on, our ability to create a neural and body copy will increase in resolution and accuracy at the same exponential pace that pertains to all information-based technologies. We ultimately will be able to capture and recreate my pattern of salient neural and physical details to any desired degree of accuracy.
Although the copy shares my pattern, it would be hard to say that the copy is me because I would (or could) still be here. You could even scan and copy me while I was sleeping. If you come to me in the morning and say, "Good news, Ray, we've successfully reinstantiated you into a more durable substrate, so we won't be needing your old body and brain anymore," I may beg to differ.
If you do the thought experiment, it's clear that the copy may look and act just like me, but it's nonetheless not me because I may not even know that he was created. Although he would have all my memories and recall having been me, from the point in time of his creation, Ray 2 would have his own unique experiences and his reality would begin to diverge from mine.
Now let's pursue this train of thought a bit further and you will see where the dilemma comes in. If we copy me, and then destroy the original, then that's the end of me because as we concluded above the copy is not me. Since the copy will do a convincing job of impersonating me, no one may know the difference, but it's nonetheless the end of me. However, this scenario is entirely equivalent to one in which I am replaced gradually. In the case of gradual replacement, there is no simultaneous old me and new me, but at the end of the gradual replacement process, you have the equivalent of the new me, and no old me. So gradual replacement also means the end of me.
However, as I pointed out at the beginning of this question, it is the case that I am in fact being continually replaced. And, by the way, it's not so gradual, but a rather rapid process. As we concluded, all that persists is my pattern. But the thought experiment above shows that gradual replacement means the end of me even if my pattern is preserved. So am I constantly being replaced by someone else who just seems a like lot me a few moments earlier?
So, again, who am I? It's the ultimate ontological question. We often refer to this question as the issue of consciousness. I have consciously (no pun intended) phrased the issue entirely in the first person because that is the nature of the issue. It is not a third person question. So my question is not "Who is John Brockman?" although John may ask this question himself.
When people speak of consciousness, they often slip into issues of behavioral and neurological correlates of consciousness (e.g., whether or not an entity can be self-reflective), but these are third person (i.e., objective) issues, and do not represent what David Chalmers calls the "hard question" of consciousness.
The question of whether or not an entity is conscious is only apparent to himself. The difference between neurological correlates of consciousness (e.g., intelligent behavior) and the ontological reality of consciousness is the difference between objective (i.e., third person) and subjective (i.e., first person) reality. For this reason, we are unable to propose an objective consciousness detector that does not have philosophical assumptions built into it.
I do say that we (humans) will come to accept that nonbiological entities are conscious because ultimately they will have all the subtle cues that humans currently possess that we associate with emotional and other subjective experiences. But that's a political and psychological prediction, not an observation that we will be able to scientifically verify. We do assume that other humans are conscious, but this is an assumption, and not something we can objectively demonstrate.
I will acknowledge that John Brockman did seem conscious to me when he interviewed me, but I should not be too quick to accept this impression. Perhaps I am really living in a simulation, and John was part of the simulation. Or, perhaps it's only my memories that exist, and the actual experience never took place. Or maybe I am only now experiencing the sensation of recalling apparent memories of having met John, but neither the experience nor the memories really exist. Well, you see the problem.
Read other questions and answers at The Edge's World Question Center.
Copyright © 2002 by Edge Foundation, Inc.
www.edge.org
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Critique of Ray's Essay
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My Critique Of
> My Question for Edge: Who am I? What am I?
> by Raymond Kurzweil
Here we go:
> Since we constantly changing, are we just patterns?
No.
> What if someone copies that pattern?
First, what exactly do you mean by this' What if someone executes precisely what sequence of physical operations?
> Am I the original and/or the copy?
What would be the meaning of either claim?
> Perhaps I am this stuff here, i.e., the ordered and chaotic
> collection of molecules that comprise my body and brain.
If you are going to claim that you are anything else, you are going to have to tell us what that something is made of.
> But there's a problem. The specific set
> of particles that comprise my body
> and brain are completely different
> from the atoms and molecules than
> comprised me only a short while
> (on the order of weeks) ago. We know
> that most of our cells are turned over
> in a matter of weeks. Even those that
> persist longer (e.g., neurons) nonetheless
> change their component
> molecules in a matter of weeks.
You devote a considerable amount of attention here to the question of how long it takes for cells to be "turned over." There must be a purpose to this. You are arguing that it is a surprisingly short time, though you ackowledge that there is a spectrum; some molecules in some tissues hang around a long time, others are continually exchanged. What difference does any of this make? Suppose the rates of exchange were a bit faster or slower, or say a lot faster or slower? Would that change the substance of your argument? Suppose the exchange rates were very slow, so that in an average lifetime, only about half of the molecules present at age 20 would have beeen exchanged by age 60? Would that have a significant impact on your argument? Or suppose the exchange was very rapid, a 50% turnover every five minutes or so? Would the continuity of biological existence be a more difficult problem then?
> So I am a completely different set of
> stuff than I was a month ago. All that
> persists is the pattern of organization
> of that stuff. The pattern changes
> also, but slowly and in a continuum
> from my past self.
Well, first of all, no, you are not a completely different set of particles than a month or even a year ago. But we already discussed that. Second, it is good that you now admit "the pattern changes also, but slowly and in a continuum from my past self." Is this not also true of the molecular replacement? Where is the discontinuity? To the contrary, I think we are all familiar with stories of people who have had moments of trauma or epiphany after which their lives were "completely changed," as if they had been one person the moment before, and another one the moment after. In such cases, I think one could claim justification for saying that "the pattern" changed abruptly in a way that, at least in some sense, broke the continuum. I don't think the steady processes of particle exchange and cell replacement even exhibit comparable violations of continuity in a single human life.
> From this perspective I am rather like the
> pattern that water makes in a stream as it
> rushes past the rocks in its path. The actual
> molecules (of water) change every millisecond,
> but the pattern persists for hours or even years.
This is a disappointingly poor metaphor coming from you, Ray. The pattern made by the water is simply the result of hydrodynamic forces caused by the presence of the rock. Humans are forms which cause themselves. I think you can find plenty of better examples of forms in nature which hang together due to the interactions of the particles and the mechanics of the system they form. We are less like ripples on water than like the fish swimming beneath them.
> So, perhaps we should say I am a pattern
> of matter and energy that persists in time.
You are a human being named Ray Kurzweil. You are a living organism. You are system of matter and energy which exchanges matter and energy with its environment. Various aspects of the system which you are can be described in terms of "patterns" which can be thought of a abstractions from the living reality, although this is only a convenient fiction, for the matter and energy are all that is, the "pattern" is just an aspect of how your mind organizes its image of the world.
> But there is a problem here as well.
> We will ultimately be able to scan and
> copy this pattern in a at least sufficient
> detail to replicate my body and
> brain to a sufficiently high degree
> of accuracy such that the copy is
> indistinguishable from the original
> (i.e., the copy could pass a "Ray
> Kurzweil" Turing test). I won't repeat
> all the arguments for this here,
It is a reasonable claim, given that you don't insist the 'scanning' can be done without destroying the original, and given that you don't make any deeper claim than the copy being able to pass for you in an operational sense.
> The copy, therefore, will share my pattern.
This is a giant leap. You haven't defined the term "pattern" nearly well enough to be able to make this inference. We assume that the copy has been made on the basis of some measurement of the structure of the original. That is likely to be an imperfect measurement. In fact, most proponents of this type of nonsense would argue that only a far from complete measurement of brain structure is needed. But in that case the copy would "share" only superficial aspects of your "pattern."
> One might counter that we may
> not get every detail correct.
The point is, your claim that "the copy will share my pattern" is not well-defined.
> But if that is true, then such an attempt
> would not constitute a proper copy.
But you claim that you can define what "a proper copy" would be?
> As time goes on, our ability to create a neural
> and body copy will increase in resolution
> and accuracy at the same exponential pace
> a. that pertains to all information-based
> technologies. We ultimately will be able to
> capture and recreate my pattern of salient neural
> and physical details to any desired degree of accuracy.
The most you can claim is that by cutting up the brain you should be able to map it all the way down to molecular-level details, and if you can do this, you should be able to implement some kind of computational model. When this may become possible is hard to say, but it seems reasonable to expect such capabilities within a few decades.
> Although the copy shares my pattern,
> it would be hard to say that the
> copy is me because I would (or could)
> still be here. You could even scan
> and copy me while I was sleeping.
For philosophical argument, we have to admit that such a process is imaginable and so we have to reckon with whatever that tells us about reality, but in fact I think it is highly doubtful that technology will ever provide the means to "copy [you] while sleeping."
> If you come to me in the morning and
> say, "Good news, Ray, we've successfully
> reinstantiated you into a more
> durable substrate, so we won't be
> needing your old body and brain
> anymore," I may beg to differ.
> If you do the thought experiment,
> it's clear that the copy may look and act
> just like me, but it's nonetheless not me
> because I may not even know that
> he was created. Although he would
> have all my memories and recall having
> been me, from the point in time of his
> creation, Ray 2 would have his own
> unique experiences and his reality
> would begin to diverge from mine.
Yes, and this argument really does demolish any claim that such a technological process would provide a route for a person to "migrate" from one "substrate" to another.
> If we copy me, and then destroy the
> original, then that's the end of me because
> as we concluded above the copy is not me.
> Since the copy will do a convincing job
> of impersonating me, no one may
> know the difference, but it's nonetheless
> the end of me. However, this
> scenario is entirely equivalent to one in
> which I am replaced gradually.
How can you claim this? What are your criteria of 'entire equivalence'?
> In the case of gradual replacement,
> there is no simultaneous old me and new me,
First you claim the scenario of disassembling someone's body molecule by molecule (or somehow remotely sensing the molecular structure by technological means not yet proposed) and creating some kind of "copy" is "entirely equivalent" to ordinary life, then in the next sentence you point out one of the significant ways in which it is different.
> but at the end of the gradual
> replacement process, you have the
> equivalent of the new me, and no
> old me. So gradual replacement also
> means the end of me.
Only if 'life' is to be thought of as 'continuous death.' What is jarring about your last sentence is precisely its claim that after "a few weeks" one is necessarily 'dead.' However, the counter to this argument is that it is obvious nonsense. There is no "end" of the ordinary process of life, apart from ordinary death. If, after a year or so, one is dead, that is a different state of affairs than if one's (mostly regenerated) life continues. The process of life does involve a continuous exchange of matter and energy with the environment. That is the way in which life is sustained, not destroyed.
> However, as I pointed out at the
> beginning of this question, it is the case
> that I am in fact being continually replaced.
It is not the case that a machine is scanning your body and making a replacement copy. It is the case that your living body is continually exchanging matter and energy with its environment.
> And, by the way, it's not so
> gradual, but a rather rapid process.
Compared with what?
> As we concluded, all that persists is my pattern.
No, we didn't conclude that, you assumed it (without ever making it very clear what the assumption meant).
> But the thought experiment above
> shows that gradual replacement
> means the end of me even if my
> pattern is preserved.
No, the failure of gradual replacement would be the end of you.
> So am I constantly being replaced by someone else who
> just seems a like lot me a few moments earlier?
No, this is nonsense. Consider these two sentences:
1) Every (moment, second, minute, ten minutes, hour, several weeks) a molecular duplicate of Smith is made and old Smith despatched painlessly and cremated.
2) Smith breathes, eats, drinks, pisses and defecates.
Do these sound like they are describing the same physical reality? No. They do not describe the same scenario, so trying to draw conclusions from equating them is nonsense.
> So, again, who am I? It's the ultimate
> ontological question. We often refer
> to this question as the issue of consciousness.
No, this is the issue of identity. It's a lot easier to resolve than either the issue of consciousness or the "ultimate ontological question" which is "What am I?"
Identity - You are first of all a single human being, a single life which has an unambiguous biological continuity and singularity from birth to death. This is the first level of reality which your mind must try to capture as it formulates a concept of identity. But it must then be recognized that most of what we mean by our identity is a social construct; we are "who we are" mostly in relation to others. Other than this, identity is a fairly empty concept. It is nonsensical, for example, to imagine that one could have been born as a different person, at a different time say, or in a different body, but having the same "identity."
The issue of consciousness is slightly different: What is this thing, experience, this extra thing that is neither the world outside nor my own actions but rather my experience of the world and my contemplations of action? This "internal life" of which I am immediately aware? What is it made of, what is its relationship to the physical world? I would answer that it is an error to think of "consciousness" as some "extra thing" that is "created" by the brain as if it were some kind of movie projector, or a radio transmitter creating an electromagnetic field. Rather, it is the body that is alive, it is the body which is conscious. I find that adopting this paradigm and this language resolves or eliminates a great many metaphysical conundrums.
> The question of whether or not an entity is
> conscious is only apparent to himself.
On the contrary, any anesthesiologist is trained to recognize signs of apparent consciousness. I would think also that anyone who engages in conversation or any social interaction with other human beings is very well aware of the signs that another person is conscious and the strong impression of his or her intelligent, conscious presence.
> The difference between neurological
> correlates of consciousness
> (e.g., intelligent behavior) and the
> ontological reality of consciousness is
> the difference between objective
> (i.e., third person) and subjective (i.e., first
> person) reality.
How is this different from the "geological correlates" of the Earth's surface phenomena versus the "ontological reality" of what it is made of? There is one important difference, which is that this entire conversation is taking place between and within persons for whom this particular object-subject split constantly applies. Therefore it can be expected to shape our thinking and our ability to think clearly about this issue.
> For this reason,
> we are unable to propose an objective
> consciousness detector that does not
> have philosophical assumptions built into it.
The only assumption is that the world is more or less what it appears to be, rather than some exotic deception such as might be imagined by a paranoid or delerious mind.
> I do say that we (humans) will come
> to accept that nonbiological entities
> are conscious because ultimately they
> will have all the subtle cues that
> humans currently possess that we
> associate with emotional and other
> subjective experiences. But that's a
> political and psychological prediction,
> not an observation that we will be
> able to scientifically verify.
Your prediction that people will "come to accept" nonbiological entites as conscious is one that may be scientifically verified, and I expect it is correct, but not only because of the "subtle cues." People will be initially thrilled by the novelty of interacting with a machine that acts like a person, but then they will ask the designer, "Is it really conscious"? The designer may choose to be coy about it, but very probably he will know the answer, either that it is conscious, because he designed to to be, or that it only fakes consciousness, because he designed it to do that.
> We do assume that other humans are
> conscious, but this is an assumption, and
> not something we can objectively demonstrate.
Again, it is not only an assumption, at least not in the same category as the assumptions, say, of monetarist economics; rather, it is an assumption any alternative to which is too stupid to waste time on.
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Re: My Question for Edge: Who am I? What am I?
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Life divides.. ergo: there is only One Life.. Evermore, Nevertheless, therefor, everything allways because ;You never can tell and it all depends,, on you anyway.. If it can happen, it will happen.. are we completing the pattern of everything expressing in Matter the One Great Thought called Life? could we be the transformative program, expressing as Life? and is the 'Future' where we come from? as the past is always dissolving. and the point of expression (power) is the Present. the fulcrum of stillness and action.. teetertottering along the road to remembering the future and expressing the past.. and the sound of the falling rain... perhaps all there Is , is Love... I am,, or i am not.. it's up to US.. there is only We.. yet i am just an illusion.. but Whose? Ours? Thankfullness opens the doors to understanding . our perceptions change. and our world depends on our point of view.. or not. again.. the rules seem to be: "You never can tell, and it All depends.."
zyzax |
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Re: My Question for Edge: Who am I? What am I?
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I'm not convinced by RK's thought experiment. Just because the new copy of me has different experiences to the old me, it doesn't necessarily stop it being me.
One could take the view that in our normal experience, 'I' am a succession of states each in a different moment in time, each with different experiences, opinions and desires, but each one close enough to the evolving pattern to be 'I'. So far we have never had two different versions of 'I' in existence at the same time, but maybe this is just a historical coincidence. If I invent a time machine in 20 years time and come back to visit myself today, then there would indisputably be two versions of me existing at the same time, although they both have quite different experiences. In fact we don't need to invent a time machine; when I think back to my childhood I can still remember how the child that I was thought and felt, and I still think that that child is me.
So why is it different if I make a copy of myself? On any objective basis the two copies of myself created by RK's thought experiment would have more in common than the child and the man, or today's me and the time travelling me. We instinctively feel that 'I' must mean a succession of states, one leading to the other with no branches, but maybe this is because we have never experienced anything else.
So when I make a copy of myself in 30 years time the original me probably won't identify with the new me as much as with the childish me. But is this just another example of the inability of humans to properly conceptualise things outside of their normal experience?
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Re: My Question for Edge: Who am I? What am I?
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[If we copy me, and then destroy the original, then that's the end of me because as we concluded above the copy is not me. Since the copy will do a convincing job of impersonating me, no one may know the difference, but it's nonetheless the end of me. However, this scenario is entirely equivalent to one in which I am replaced gradually. In the case of gradual replacement, there is no simultaneous old me and new me, but at the end of the gradual replacement process, you have the equivalent of the new me, and no old me. So gradual replacement also means the end of me.]
Nice analysis by Ray Kurzweil. The only problem I found in the article was in the last sentence of the above segment. Gradual replacement is clearly not the same as death of a pattern, as it is suggested here, thus the two scenarios can't be equivalent. In the first scenario, the original mind (pattern) which already diverged from the copy is destroyed, while in the second scenario the original pattern still lives on, therefore the two scenarios are different. In fact, gradual replacement is in my view, the only way to transfer the original mind to nonbiological brain without making unnecessary copies. That way this perfect cloning can be avoided altogether.
Slawek
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Re: You are your mind: thoughts and memories of your world as experienced by your mind!
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> From the instant the copy is made its thoughts diverge from the original because its existence is immediately different from the original.
Yes, yes - but how do you know which one differs? How the original knows, how to behave to stay the original?
> Can a copy be made such that they share the same mind?
I am afraid, it's the only option.
> Say I have a machine that links two minds together (Vulcan mind meld?). If I use this machine on me and Ray we become one consciousness.
I am not sure, you aren't already. Just my White and Black chess players.
> We know each others memories and sense everything as one but from two bodies.
It's not mandatory at all! Sometimes you don't fell your own body. White had no clue, that the Black's chair was a little shaky.
> Our combined consciousness will sense pleasure and pain as one.
I am saying that. Only separate in space. Just as you are familiar with the time separation in your present case, it's not much different with the space case. But remember Black and white.
> The death of one body (the mind still alive) simply reduce the stimulus for the combined consciousness.
Killing White would mean Black has nobody to play with. The more the marrier!
> Let's say I have a machine that can inject thoughts and memories into my mind. These thoughts and memories become one with me. They help define me.
You don't need any memories to define you. Maybe a little, but everybody could have the same memo fond.
> Your mind can be moved into another body (some day).
My memories. I've concluded, that my mind has to be all around 20 years ago. Since others have (the most likely) the same "felling of I".
> Your consciousness, however, can not be separated from your mind because it is your mind.
An instance. The mental environment can be slightly different But that does not count. As it doesn't count, when changes inside one machine. I've never concluded "That is not I, since this memory is false". If somebody injected Cezar's memories inside my head - I wouldn't mind at all! So wouldn't Cezar - except that he would be glad to survive all those knifes somehow - somewhere.
> Who am I? My unique thoughts and memories as experienced by my mind!
Unique? Are you sure? Are you sure it matters?
> What am I? A mind that generates thoughts and stores memories based on internal and external stimulus!
You are a relative locator: "I am here!". Something like that.
> As you can see, "Who am I? What am I?" can only be defined in terms of me and my experiences
I think it has nothing to do with that. You don't mind what happened to you - to decide whetter it is you or somebody else.
- Thomas |
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Re: You are your mind: thoughts and memories of your world as experienced by your mind!
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>> From the instant the copy is made its thoughts diverge from the original because its existence is immediately different from the original.
>Yes, yes - but how do you know which one differs? How the original knows, how to behave to stay the original?
From a consciousness point of view (at least from the stance I'm taking on it) it doesn't matter how they differ because the instant the copy is created it differs and therefore is not longer a copy. If I photocopy a sheet of paper then mark up the copy, the copy has become original.
An interesting point is that the copy thinks it is the original.
>> Can a copy be made such that they share the same mind?
>I am afraid, it's the only option.
I disagree. If a copy is created it will be creating its own thoughts just as you and I have different thoughts therefore the mind (consciousness) is separate from the original.
>> Say I have a machine that links two minds together (Vulcan mind meld?). If I use this machine on me and Ray we become one consciousness.
>I am not sure, you aren't already. Just my White and Black chess players.
Think of it this way: If Ray and I were linked and you asked me who I am, Ray could answer for me. There is no thought, memory or sensation that we don't share.
>> We know each others memories and sense everything as one but from two bodies.
>It's not mandatory at all! Sometimes you don't fell your own body. White had no clue, that the Black's chair was a little shaky.
I'm not familiar with the Chess players to which you refer. I'm simply presenting a hypothetical situation in which Ray and I share the same mind, thoughts, memories and sensations, therefore, in my world-with-this-linking-machine, Ray and I will see, touch, taste, hear, feel, think, and remember the same thing throughout our lives (while linked), simultaneously and instantaneously.
>> Let's say I have a machine that can inject thoughts and memories into my mind. These thoughts and memories become one with me. They help define me.
>You don't need any memories to define you. Maybe a little, but everybody could have the same memo fond.
I did said "thoughts and memories HELP define me". Referring back to the first point, a copy of me will have the same memories as me and, as far as the copy is concerned, is me, but our thoughts and memories diverge immediately, creating separate individuals, each constructing individual memories (if they are capable).
>> Your consciousness, however, can not be separated from your mind because it is your mind.
>An instance. The mental environment can be slightly different But that does not count. As it doesn't count, when changes inside one machine. I've never concluded "That is not I, since this memory is false". If somebody injected Cezar's memories inside my head - I wouldn't mind at all! So wouldn't Cezar - except that he would be glad to survive all those knifes somehow - somewhere.
If someone injected Cezar's memories into your head it wouldn't, in any way, have an impact on Cezar. If I was injected with your memories right now, I would simply have additional memories. It wouldn't affect you at all (unless obtaining the memories affected you in some way).
>> Who am I? My unique thoughts and memories as experienced by my mind!
>Unique? Are you sure? Are you sure it matters?
The simple fact that no one is me, no one is sensing what I sense, makes me unique.
>> What am I? A mind that generates thoughts and stores memories based on internal and external stimulus!
>You are a relative locator: "I am here!". Something like that.
In absolute terms, I am somewhere.
>> As you can see, "Who am I? What am I?" can only be defined in terms of me and my experiences
>I think it has nothing to do with that. You don't mind what happened to you - to decide whetter it is you or somebody else.
Let me clarify: "Who am I? What am I?" is a recursive definition.
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Re: You are your mind: thoughts and memories of your world as experienced by your mind!
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There is a difference between recursive definitions in this sense and paradox.
The recursive definition of "I" is a recursive refinement in which the context of "I" changes as the definition expands, becomes more accurate and more detailed. For example, "I am my thoughts", "My thoughts are produced by stimulation of my senses and by my thoughts", "My senses are my ___", "My ___ is my ___", ... until we list all that is known about human beings. In each statement, you have more accurately defined "I" but also, possibly, changed the context of "I". "I am my thoughts, my senses, my memories, my ___", ... I am the everything that I am at an given instant in time and am continuously changing.
I'm saying that you will never reach a point when you can make the statement "I am ____" where you can fill in the blank with something that doesn't pertain to you.
If you try, you've created a paradox, and your statement is likely wrong or ill-defined. "I am you"!?
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Re: My Question for Edge: Who am I? What am I?
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Permit me to answer this question with the following poetry :-)
They took my home, I said I have my money
They took my money, I said I have my dear ones,
They took my dear ones, I said I have my body
They took my body, I said I have my intellect
They took my intellect, I said I have my memory
They took my memory, I said I have my feelings
They took my feelings, I said I have my will
They took my will, I said I have my emotions
They took emotions, I said I have my pleasure and pain
They took even my pain, then I said I still exist,
despite everything I'm still there and I'm unique.
Then they killed me.
But they never told me who I was.
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Re: My Question for Edge: Who am I? What am I?
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My Critique Of
> My Question for Edge: Who am I? What am I?
> by Raymond Kurzweil
Here we go:
> Since we constantly changing, are we just patterns?
No.
> What if someone copies that pattern?
First, what exactly do you mean by this' What if someone executes precisely what sequence of physical operations?
> Am I the original and/or the copy?
What would be the meaning of either claim?
> Perhaps I am this stuff here, i.e., the ordered and chaotic
> collection of molecules that comprise my body and brain.
If you are going to claim that you are anything else, you are going to have to tell us what that something is made of.
> But there's a problem. The specific set
> of particles that comprise my body
> and brain are completely different
> from the atoms and molecules than
> comprised me only a short while
> (on the order of weeks) ago. We know
> that most of our cells are turned over
> in a matter of weeks. Even those that
> persist longer (e.g., neurons) nonetheless
> change their component
> molecules in a matter of weeks.
You devote a considerable amount of attention here to the question of how long it takes for cells to be "turned over." There must be a purpose to this. You are arguing that it is a surprisingly short time, though you ackowledge that there is a spectrum; some molecules in some tissues hang around a long time, others are continually exchanged. What difference does any of this make? Suppose the rates of exchange were a bit faster or slower, or say a lot faster or slower? Would that change the substance of your argument? Suppose the exchange rates were very slow, so that in an average lifetime, only about half of the molecules present at age 20 would have beeen exchanged by age 60? Would that have a significant impact on your argument? Or suppose the exchange was very rapid, a 50% turnover every five minutes or so? Would the continuity of biological existence be a more difficult problem then?
> So I am a completely different set of
> stuff than I was a month ago. All that
> persists is the pattern of organization
> of that stuff. The pattern changes
> also, but slowly and in a continuum
> from my past self.
Well, first of all, no, you are not a completely different set of particles than a month or even a year ago. But we already discussed that. Second, it is good that you now admit "the pattern changes also, but slowly and in a continuum from my past self." Is this not also true of the molecular replacement? Where is the discontinuity? To the contrary, I think we are all familiar with stories of people who have had moments of trauma or epiphany after which their lives were "completely changed," as if they had been one person the moment before, and another one the moment after. In such cases, I think one could claim justification for saying that "the pattern" changed abruptly in a way that, at least in some sense, broke the continuum. I don't think the steady processes of particle exchange and cell replacement even exhibit comparable violations of continuity in a single human life.
> From this perspective I am rather like the
> pattern that water makes in a stream as it
> rushes past the rocks in its path. The actual
> molecules (of water) change every millisecond,
> but the pattern persists for hours or even years.
This is a disappointingly poor metaphor coming from you, Ray. The pattern made by the water is simply the result of hydrodynamic forces caused by the presence of the rock. Humans are forms which cause themselves. I think you can find plenty of better examples of forms in nature which hang together due to the interactions of the particles and the mechanics of the system they form. We are less like ripples on water than like the fish swimming beneath them.
> So, perhaps we should say I am a pattern
> of matter and energy that persists in time.
You are a human being named Ray Kurzweil. You are a living organism. You are system of matter and energy which exchanges matter and energy with its environment. Various aspects of the system which you are can be described in terms of "patterns" which can be thought of a abstractions from the living reality, although this is only a convenient fiction, for the matter and energy are all that is, the "pattern" is just an aspect of how your mind organizes its image of the world.
> But there is a problem here as well.
> We will ultimately be able to scan and
> copy this pattern in a at least sufficient
> detail to replicate my body and
> brain to a sufficiently high degree
> of accuracy such that the copy is
> indistinguishable from the original
> (i.e., the copy could pass a "Ray
> Kurzweil" Turing test). I won't repeat
> all the arguments for this here,
It is a reasonable claim, given that you don't insist the 'scanning' can be done without destroying the original, and given that you don't make any deeper claim than the copy being able to pass for you in an operational sense.
> The copy, therefore, will share my pattern.
This is a giant leap. You haven't defined the term "pattern" nearly well enough to be able to make this inference. We assume that the copy has been made on the basis of some measurement of the structure of the original. That is likely to be an imperfect measurement. In fact, most proponents of this type of nonsense would argue that only a far from complete measurement of brain structure is needed. But in that case the copy would "share" only superficial aspects of your "pattern."
> One might counter that we may
> not get every detail correct.
The point is, your claim that "the copy will share my pattern" is not well-defined.
> But if that is true, then such an attempt
> would not constitute a proper copy.
But you claim that you can define what "a proper copy" would be?
> As time goes on, our ability to create a neural
> and body copy will increase in resolution
> and accuracy at the same exponential pace
> a. that pertains to all information-based
> technologies. We ultimately will be able to
> capture and recreate my pattern of salient neural
> and physical details to any desired degree of accuracy.
The most you can claim is that by cutting up the brain you should be able to map it all the way down to molecular-level details, and if you can do this, you should be able to implement some kind of computational model. When this may become possible is hard to say, but it seems reasonable to expect such capabilities within a few decades.
> Although the copy shares my pattern,
> it would be hard to say that the
> copy is me because I would (or could)
> still be here. You could even scan
> and copy me while I was sleeping.
For philosophical argument, we have to admit that such a process is imaginable and so we have to reckon with whatever that tells us about reality, but in fact I think it is highly doubtful that technology will ever provide the means to "copy [you] while sleeping."
> If you come to me in the morning and
> say, "Good news, Ray, we've successfully
> reinstantiated you into a more
> durable substrate, so we won't be
> needing your old body and brain
> anymore," I may beg to differ.
> If you do the thought experiment,
> it's clear that the copy may look and act
> just like me, but it's nonetheless not me
> because I may not even know that
> he was created. Although he would
> have all my memories and recall having
> been me, from the point in time of his
> creation, Ray 2 would have his own
> unique experiences and his reality
> would begin to diverge from mine.
Yes, and this argument really does demolish any claim that such a technological process would provide a route for a person to "migrate" from one "substrate" to another.
> If we copy me, and then destroy the
> original, then that's the end of me because
> as we concluded above the copy is not me.
> Since the copy will do a convincing job
> of impersonating me, no one may
> know the difference, but it's nonetheless
> the end of me. However, this
> scenario is entirely equivalent to one in
> which I am replaced gradually.
How can you claim this? What are your criteria of 'entire equivalence'?
> In the case of gradual replacement,
> there is no simultaneous old me and new me,
First you claim the scenario of disassembling someone's body molecule by molecule (or somehow remotely sensing the molecular structure by technological means not yet proposed) and creating some kind of "copy" is "entirely equivalent" to ordinary life, then in the next sentence you point out one of the significant ways in which it is different.
> but at the end of the gradual
> replacement process, you have the
> equivalent of the new me, and no
> old me. So gradual replacement also
> means the end of me.
Only if 'life' is to be thought of as 'continuous death.' What is jarring about your last sentence is precisely its claim that after "a few weeks" one is necessarily 'dead.' However, the counter to this argument is that it is obvious nonsense. There is no "end" of the ordinary process of life, apart from ordinary death. If, after a year or so, one is dead, that is a different state of affairs than if one's (mostly regenerated) life continues. The process of life does involve a continuous exchange of matter and energy with the environment. That is the way in which life is sustained, not destroyed.
> However, as I pointed out at the
> beginning of this question, it is the case
> that I am in fact being continually replaced.
It is not the case that a machine is scanning your body and making a replacement copy. It is the case that your living body is continually exchanging matter and energy with its environment.
> And, by the way, it's not so
> gradual, but a rather rapid process.
Compared with what?
> As we concluded, all that persists is my pattern.
No, we didn't conclude that, you assumed it (without ever making it very clear what the assumption meant).
> But the thought experiment above
> shows that gradual replacement
> means the end of me even if my
> pattern is preserved.
No, the failure of gradual replacement would be the end of you.
> So am I constantly being replaced by someone else who
> just seems a like lot me a few moments earlier?
No, this is nonsense. Consider these two sentences:
1) Every (moment, second, minute, ten minutes, hour, several weeks) a molecular duplicate of Smith is made and old Smith despatched painlessly and cremated.
2) Smith breathes, eats, drinks, pisses and defecates.
Do these sound like they are describing the same physical reality? No. They do not describe the same scenario, so trying to draw conclusions from equating them is nonsense.
> So, again, who am I? It's the ultimate
> ontological question. We often refer
> to this question as the issue of consciousness.
No, this is the issue of identity. It's a lot easier to resolve than either the issue of consciousness or the "ultimate ontological question" which is "What am I?"
Identity - You are first of all a single human being, a single life which has an unambiguous biological continuity and singularity from birth to death. This is the first level of reality which your mind must try to capture as it formulates a concept of identity. But it must then be recognized that most of what we mean by our identity is a social construct; we are "who we are" mostly in relation to others. Other than this, identity is a fairly empty concept. It is nonsensical, for example, to imagine that one could have been born as a different person, at a different time say, or in a different body, but having the same "identity."
The issue of consciousness is slightly different: What is this thing, experience, this extra thing that is neither the world outside nor my own actions but rather my experience of the world and my contemplations of action? This "internal life" of which I am immediately aware? What is it made of, what is its relationship to the physical world? I would answer that it is an error to think of "consciousness" as some "extra thing" that is "created" by the brain as if it were some kind of movie projector, or a radio transmitter creating an electromagnetic field. Rather, it is the body that is alive, it is the body which is conscious. I find that adopting this paradigm and this language resolves or eliminates a great many metaphysical conundrums.
> The question of whether or not an entity is
> conscious is only apparent to himself.
On the contrary, any anesthesiologist is trained to recognize signs of apparent consciousness. I would think also that anyone who engages in conversation or any social interaction with other human beings is very well aware of the signs that another person is conscious and the strong impression of his or her intelligent, conscious presence.
> The difference between neurological
> correlates of consciousness
> (e.g., intelligent behavior) and the
> ontological reality of consciousness is
> the difference between objective
> (i.e., third person) and subjective (i.e., first
> person) reality.
How is this different from the "geological correlates" of the Earth's surface phenomena versus the "ontological reality" of what it is made of? There is one important difference, which is that this entire conversation is taking place between and within persons for whom this particular object-subject split constantly applies. Therefore it can be expected to shape our thinking and our ability to think clearly about this issue.
> For this reason,
> we are unable to propose an objective
> consciousness detector that does not
> have philosophical assumptions built into it.
The only assumption is that the world is more or less what it appears to be, rather than some exotic deception such as might be imagined by a paranoid or delerious mind.
> I do say that we (humans) will come
> to accept that nonbiological entities
> are conscious because ultimately they
> will have all the subtle cues that
> humans currently possess that we
> associate with emotional and other
> subjective experiences. But that's a
> political and psychological prediction,
> not an observation that we will be
> able to scientifically verify.
Your prediction that people will "come to accept" nonbiological entites as conscious is one that may be scientifically verified, and I expect it is correct, but not only because of the "subtle cues." People will be initially thrilled by the novelty of interacting with a machine that acts like a person, but then they will ask the designer, "Is it really conscious"? The designer may choose to be coy about it, but very probably he will know the answer, either that it is conscious, because he designed to to be, or that it only fakes consciousness, because he designed it to do that.
> We do assume that other humans are
> conscious, but this is an assumption, and
> not something we can objectively demonstrate.
Again, it is not only an assumption, at least not in the same category as the assumptions, say, of monetarist economics; rather, it is an assumption any alternative to which is too stupid to waste time on.
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Re: Transformation
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Hello, Megatron, I am Xanthor, if you like.
Against your very elaborate construction of words, the activity of your brain, by which you have led yourself to a zen-like state of equivocation and indifference, I can only offer the brute fact that at any given point in the future the human species will either exist or not, and this is the question of survival which occupies us to such a large degree since our existence itself is tautological: we are that which survives. As a byproduct of this survival process, human beings and all their creations, cultures, religions and civilizations have been created, and these are the things we wish to preserve. Your thoughts are a brief for their destruction. This alone condemns them as immoral. But they are also illogical, as I shall now demonstrate. You begin by the observation that each time (so to speak) you listen to this one (so to speak) Jimmy Page track it seems to be exactly the same, thus "the same song." No doubt this is a very useful notion, and no doubt it is strictly true in a certain sense. But the same statement interpreted in a different sense would not necessarily be true. The fact is that at a certain time Jimmy Page, an organism identified at any given time with a particular set (with fuzzy margins) of elementary particles, went through certain motions which caused sound to be created and simultaneously "recorded," which is a process in which the variations of air pressure which constitute sound are measured and the physical properties of a recording medium set to values which correspond to those measurements. The physical properties of the recording medium was then measured repeatedly, and the physical properties of other recording media set to values corresponding to the results of the measurement of the first recording medium, and so on, in a process known as "copying." Finally, the physical properties of some recording medium are measured and use to create air pressure waves corresponding to those created in the original Jimmy Page recording session. This process can be repeated any number of times. There you have a complete physical description of what has taken place, without ever needing to make reference to the fiction of a "song" which is "the same song" in any number of copies. This latter is, in fact, an object which has no existence independent of its "representations" or "embodiments," nor is there any justification for the claim that the existence of such representations causes the separate existence of some universal entity which is common to each physical representation. In other words, the disc is all there is; the song recorded on it is just a convenient fiction of your mind, which helps you to organize the world in terms which are useful to the business of arranging things as you like them, such as a comfortable room with Led Zepplin looping in the background. Similarly, the problem with the abstract notion of "identity" in humans, apart from the fact that it is nothing more than a disguised representation of the idea of the supernatural soul, is that it refers to an object which does not in fact exist. There is not some thing which can be transferred from one living human body to another "embodiment," by any process be it "Transformation" or discontinuous replacement, which has the property of consituting the true essence of an individual person and therefore by its transfer inducing the actual migration of that person from one body to another. This very notion is absurd, since it postulates that the person is somehow separable or in any way separate from his or her body. "Transformation" of the body by a continuous process does not ensure that the person at the end of the transformational process is the same as the person at the beginning, but rather, in what is here the only meaningful sense, it ensures, by definition, precisely the opposite, i.e. that the person at the end will be different, assuming it is a person at all. One can imagine the continuous transformation of a person into a high-voltage power line tower. Or into a super-duper fancy computer of the future. Into all kinds of horrible things, but only the preservation of human form would justify claiming that the individual life of a human being was thus extended. Likewise, the broad question before us is that of the survival of the human species in whole. In no way can the continuous transformation of human beings into nanorobotic systems or supercomputer software be considered the continuation of human existence. |
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Re: Transformation
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Correct Xanthor. We are that which survives.
And our elected Government is entrusted with ensuring that the will of the majority is actualized. The majority of people in my experience have a wonderful amount of good common sense, and will never allow the collective suicide that the "singularity" and its bretheren entail. When events get closer, the government will take steps to ensure that catastrophe is avoided, by any means necessary. Even if it means nuclear attacks on rouge nation countries that do not follow international treaty clock speed limitation regulations or allow NATO inspections of their technology facilities. Physical attacks will be highly effective. Breakdown of infrastructure will surely slow down the process of tech advance in a techno law violator. Chip manufacturing clean rooms are notoriously sensitive to B-52's. Internally, to ensure that rogue elements do not willfully break the techno-stasis treaty laws, a careful monitoring society must evolve, akin to George Orwells 1984. 2084 will have a Big Brother who is snooping in every corner to ensure that rogue technologies do not evolve. The biggest change will be the mindset we have taken for granted, that progress is good. That must change. Progress must be seen for what it is, a potentially danger that must be carefully controlled and regulated. The freedom to inovate that we took for granted must go. A good analogy is firearm laws. Its not OK to shoot your high powered rifle in your back yard in the suburbs. It was OK 50 years ago when there was miles of woods around, but no more. Too dangerous. The police will pay you a visit if you try it just once. And there will be those who don't like it, but get over it, things change. For those who are born with the extraordinary need to create, there will be alternatives such as massive jigsaw puzzles with a million pieces, which surely will keep the creative ones busy, yet safely occupied, indefinitely. Bottom line is we must start thinking in radically different terms regarding what is admirable behavior.. Excessive creativity will be discouraged and if uncontrollable, medicated and focused on non productive activity. Surgery is always an option for extreme cases. And we will require much more government to ensure that these rules are enforced, and government which ruthlessly enforces these rules world wide. Its not a pretty world, but that is where these technophiles are leading us. In the long run, being terribly clever is perhaps not so clever after all. These are the good old days. Enjoy them.
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Re: Transformation
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ted3456... would that be Kaczynski? Anyhow,
I can't decide if you are trying to sound sarcastic, parody a "statist luddite," or if you're serious about any of this. I don't know who, besides sarcastic technocultists, proposes "clock speed limitations" or bombing clean rooms to enforce technological "stasis." The question is not technology-good vs. technology-bad, but good technology vs. bad technology, or better stated, good uses of technology vs. bad uses. The fact that we have laws against bad uses of technology is not inappropriate or surprising. That's not going to change as technology advances, and there are new issues posed by new and coming technologies, so there will need to be new laws, and yes, they will need to be enforced. There is no reason why this should have the dystopian implications suggested in your "Big Brother" scenario. The consequences of anarchy in an environment of 21st-century technology would be far grimmer even than your little grostesque. |
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Re: Transformation
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Well said. I recently read Nick Bostrums "Dangerous Futures" and I couldnt agree more. There are too many ways to catastrophically fail, and our self control is non existent. Our ancestors have survived in various forms for 2 billion years of direct descent only to be snuffed out in an instant by our recently evolved intelligence. Yet life can be so good (human life that is). There is so much beauty in the human soul, it is worth preserving. The sheer delight and beauty of a happy childs world can never be improved upon with any technology. Our lives could be getting easier every year, instead they get more hectic, stressed and pressured. I'm convinced the 1970's were the highpoint of human existence, at least in the US. Life for young people was easy, sex drugs and rock n roll were the only really pressing concerns. Enough technology to make life easy and fun, not so much that it starts to dominate our culture and create a self accelerating rat race. We could build a perfect world if we used common sense and self restraint. However, the continuing rise of the intelligensia has prohibited that. A sub species of humans has discovered that intellectual differences can be best exploited by introducing ever increasing complexity into the cultural stream, so they artificially have created a demand for more of it, helping themselves and their offspring by widening their niche. This has worked well for them for the past few hundred years, but now the end result is in sight. The niche turns out to be a dead end. How unfortunate. Most of the posters on these boards belong to that group, and take for granted the self evident truths of the intelligensia, that more technology, more complexity, is better. However, the common sense of the masses is what propelled us for 2 billion years, and their truth is that what every mother knows, that (human) life is precious and sacred, and must carry on. |
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Re: Transformation
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> It seems obvious that we could be our pattern;
The first problem is that the term "our pattern" is not well defined.
At any given moment, the matter which makes up your body (including, for convenience, the air in your lungs, the dirt on your skin, etc.) can be said to be in a quantum state which if we could write it down would constitute a complete description of you (you the actual person, not your relationships, social roles, property, works, etc.).
However, this full quantum state would contain a huge amount of information, most of it in fact, which most people would not think was particularly important. The people who want to claim that a xeroxes of a person is the person argue that one can reduce the specification from the full quantum state to some much smaller amount of data which they would call "the pattern" (or some other word meaning soul). There is no obvious or well-justified way to decide what this vastly reduced specification should be, in order that an object made to that specification should be regarded as "you."
Some people think it's enough to say the xerox is you if it looks and acts convincingly like you do. But in that case, I could just hire an actor, have him study how to impersonate you and get him the right plastic surgery, and presto, he's "actually" you.
> If a sock is darned so that none of the original yarn is
> not part of the sock, then is it the same sock?
This is just a question of what you will call the sock. You can say it's the same sock, you can say it's a different one; what you call it doesn't change the thing itself.
You can ask, if instead of darning the sock over and over, I took the same yarn, burned the sock and knitted a new one, is it the same sock? In that case, you probably would say no, but in any case, the sock doesn't care.
> Then again my spiritual beliefs get in the way. Laws of
> Karma etc. But I'm sure few people are interested in that.
I have always said the idea of "uploading" to a computer or other "substrate" is nothing but a kind of voodoo which can only be rationalized within some set of at least quasi-religious assumptions.
If you want to believe in soul transfer, in fundamentally religous terms, you are free to do so, and to imagine that any kind of voodoo (technology of soul transfer) is possible, as you like.
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Re: Transformation
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I have quite a story to tell you ...
Long ago - 20 years - I came to the conclusion, that the parallel presence is a fact.
I've wrote here a lot about that already. How it's relatively easy to understand it, by modeling it with the odd and even microseconds. Mr. White and Mr. Black. They are both convinced, from theirs perspectives, that they are separate. Just like we are. Convinced?
But when we realize, that there is nothing like uniqueness of self, we must admit, that the process may be just the same.
Two obstacles prevent us to grasp it in full.
One is the feeling which equates us with memories. But this one is obviously wrong. The memories are irregular and optional and even the same.
The other one is more important. If the "mem: I, myself" is the same everywhere where it pops up - the genes, it's hardware mark - aren't.
In the past - believing something like that would be a significant bad for your genes.
So, how is the world looks from the 12 billion eyes?
We don't know. It's locally disconnected info process. What we know, is that SELF is all around and most probably the same. And we can imagine it from many corners.
The average corner is not a very good one. From the eyes of a poor young person from the third world.
It's mind blowing, I know. And the Singularity becomes a necessity - not a bonus, if it's true.
- Thomas
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Transformation
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Xanthor, (I haven't decided), is that an incredibly complicated way of saying (?) , I fear your vision. Does that prevent what I said from being true? Truth? Aye, that is a tricky subject as well. It is easy to observe that the transformation of the human race is inevitable. I was not merely discussing individual processes. Also, your absolutely pointless explanation of scientific processes amused me immensely. I think that is one of the cleverer replies I have ever received to exhibit a wilful desire to avoid adressing the point. Allow me to say, it is not utlimately desirable that the human race remain the same as it is now. Only a fool would argue with that. As I have said, where you and now... is the threshold of the ability to determine your future advancement. How will you shape it? What do you want out of future? What do you save, and what do you disgard? You may have to decide this quickly, though it is a classical question, one you should have spent the last few millennia seriously musing. I applaud those who have. Those with vision. Who are not blinded by their fears. |
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